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INTRODUCTION 
The new Civil Code of Québec[1], which came into force on January 1, 1994, replaced 
the 1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada.[2]In replacing the former Code, did the Quebec 
legislature exceed its powers by repealing the provisions of that pre-Confederation statute 
dealing with interest, bills of exchange and promissory notes? The question arises 
because the Parliament of Canada has had exclusive authority over these matters since 
the coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1867[3], specifically under subsections 
91(18) (bills of exchange and promissory notes) and 91(19) (interest) of that Act. It is this 
question that will be considered in this report. 
To begin with, we will see that under section 129 of the Constitution, all pre-
Confederation law continued in force "as if the Union had not been made", and the power 
to amend or repeal that law was divided between the two levels of government (I). To 
determine whether the Parliament of Canada or the Quebec legislature was granted the 
power to repeal C.C.L.C. provisions concerning interest and negotiable instruments[4] 
(II), the specific relationship between federal and provincial jurisdiction in the area of 
private law must be considered (II.A). To do this, three points will be examined: first, the 
various meanings of the concept of exclusivity of federal and provincial jurisdiction 
(II.A.1); second, the recognition that the provinces have fundamental jurisdiction in the 
area of private law (II.A.2); and third, the granting of exceptional jurisdiction in this area 
to the federal Parliament (II.A.3). An understanding of the very specific nature of the 
division of powers in relation to private law will make it possible to better understand the 
scope given by the courts to the federal Parliament's exclusive and ancillary powers in 
respect of negotiable instruments (II.A.3.i) and interest (II.A.3.ii). 
Once the scope of these federal and provincial powers has been determined, an 
examination of the pre-Confederation provisions of the C.C.L.C. can be undertaken 
(II.B). I will identify the provisions of that statute, if any still existed at the time of its 
repeal in 1991, that fell in whole or in part under Parliament's exclusive power over 
negotiable instruments and interest. Finally, in light of these findings, I will set out my 
recommendations for resolving the constitutional difficulties raised by the repeal of these 
provisions by the Quebec legislature. 
I. -CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE POWER TO AMEND PRE-
CONFEDERATION LAW: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
In the following pages, I will show that the level of government that has jurisdiction over 
the matter to which a given pre-Confederation provision relates also has the power to 
amend or repeal that provision (A). I will then briefly consider the specific problem 
raised by pre-Confederation provisions that may apply in both an area of federal law and 
an area of provincial law (B). Lastly, a word will be said about the power to implicitly 
repeal pre-Confederation provisions (C). All of these issues must be addressed before a 
more specific examination of the pre-Confederation provisions of the C.C.L.C. is 
undertaken, as they relate to negotiable instruments and interest. To address these issues, 
I will briefly consider the interpretation of section 129 of the Constitution.[5] 
A. Section 129: continuation in force of pre-Confederation law and distribution of 
the power to repeal 
This section reads as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all Laws in force in Canada, Nova Scotia, or 
New Brunswick at the Union, and all Courts of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, and all 
legal Commissions, Powers, and Authorities, and all Officers, Judicial, Administrative, 
and Ministerial, existing therein at the Union , shall continue in Ontario, Quebec, Nova 
Scotia, and New Brunswick respectively, as if the Union had not been made; subject 
nevertheless (except with respect to such as are enacted by or exist under Acts of the 
Parliament of Great Britain or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland), to be repealed, abolished, or altered by the Parliament of Canada, or by the 
Legislature of the respective Province, according to the Authority of the Parliament or of 
that Legislature under this Act. 
There is no doubt that this section provides for the continuation in force of pre-
Confederation law, since that law can be applied by the courts in so far as it has not been 
amended or repealed by the competent legislative authority. I will therefore not examine 
this facet of section 129 in any detail[6]. Rather, this study will be concerned with the 
second function of section 129. 
As far as the power to amend pre-Confederation law is concerned, the courts were quick 
to establish the principle that [Translation] "the provincial legislatures and the federal 
Parliament can directly and specifically amend or repeal only those statutes that they 
have the authority to re-enact"[7]. 
The first important decision on the scope of section 129 of the Constitution is Dobie v. 
The Temporalities Board,[8] which was rendered by the Privy Council in 1882. In that 
case, a challenge was made to the constitutional validity of a Quebec statute enacted in 
1875[9] that repealed a statute passed by the united province of Canada in 1858[10]. The 
purpose of the 1858 statute had been to establish a corporation called the "Board for the 
management of the Temporalities Fund of the Presbyterian Church of Canada". The 
purpose of the challenged Quebec statute was simply to end that corporation's legal 
existence and substitute another for it. The issue was whether the statute was within the 
jurisdiction of the province of Quebec. 
In a now famous passage, the Privy Council stated that the power of the federal 
Parliament or the provincial legislatures to amend pre-Confederation law is "made 
precisely co-extensive with the powers of direct legislation with which these bodies are 
invested by the other clauses of the Act of 1867"[11]. It is therefore necessary to look to 
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution to determine which of the two levels of 
government has legislative authority to amend or repeal a given pre-Confederation 
legislative provision. In short, if it could have been established in Dobie that the Quebec 
legislature could have enacted a statute identical to the 1858 statute in all respects, then 
the repealing statute of 1875 would have been found valid[12]. However, the judge 
concluded that this had not been proved. He stated that the 1875 statute was not in 
relation to a matter that fell within the classes of subjects assigned to the province of 
Quebec, since it concerned civil rights outside Quebec[13]. Indeed, the impugned statute 
regulated the company's rights and obligations in both Quebec and Ontario. 
The judge also refused to validate the repeal effected by the 1875 statute, limiting its 
scope to matters that fell under the legislative authority of the province of Quebec. He 
noted that the 1875 statute did not state that the repeal was limited to matters over which 
the province of Quebec had jurisdiction. He also stated that "the matters to which its 
provisions relate, are in reality not divisible according to the limits of provincial 
authority".[14] He added the following on the same page: "In every case where an Act 
applicable to the two provinces of Quebec and Ontario can now be validly repealed by 
one of them, the result must be to leave the Act in full vigour within the other province. 
But in the present case the legislation of Quebec must necessarily affect the rights and 
status of the corporation as previously existing in the province of Ontario, as well as the 
rights and interests of individual corporators in that province." If the provisions falling 
under the jurisdiction of the Quebec legislature could have been distinguished from the 
provisions falling under the jurisdiction of the Ontario legislature, then the Quebec 
legislature could have repealed the provisions within its jurisdiction.[15] Since that was 
impossible, only the federal Parliament had jurisdiction to repeal the 1858 statute.[16] 
Up to this point, I have considered the power of a province to amend or repeal a pre-
Confederation legislative provision. However, it is now necessary to analyse the nature of 
the power that the federal Parliament can exercise in respect of a pre-Confederation norm 
relating to a matter that falls within its jurisdiction under section 91 of the Constitution. 
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [17] confirms that the 
power to amend pre-Confederation law was distributed on the basis of sections 91 and 92 
of the Constitution. The Court also gave its opinion on the scope of the federal power to 
repeal pre-Confederation norms. I will look at each of these two points in turn. 
One of the questions on which the Privy Council had to rule in the case was the 
constitutionality of Parliament's repeal of the Temperance Act [18] passed in 1864 by the 
united province of Canada. To begin with, Lord Watson found that the challenged federal 
statute, the Canada Temperance Act,[19] could validly be based on Parliament's residual 
jurisdiction.[20] Nonetheless, he went on to state that Parliament did not have jurisdiction 
to repeal the 1864 pre-Confederation statute by means of that Act. Neither the federal 
Parliament nor the provincial legislatures, he noted, could repeal statutes that they did not 
have the power to enact.[21] Since the 1864 statute applied only to Upper Canada, 
Parliament could not repeal it, as it was not a statute that it could have directly enacted: 
"In the present case the Parliament of Canada would have no power to pass a prohibitory 
law for the province of Ontario; and could therefore have no authority to repeal in 
express terms an Act which is limited in its operation to that province".[22] While this 
last conclusion may be open to question today,[23] the decision confirms that the 
characterization, under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution, of the matter to which a 
pre-Confederation provision relates will make it possible to determine whether it is the 
federal government or the provinces that can legislate with respect to the provision. 
Because of his opinion that Parliament could not amend the statute in question, Lord 
Watson did not have to take a detailed look at the nature and extent of Parliament's power 
to amend or repeal a pre-Confederation provision within its own jurisdiction. In obiter, he 
nonetheless stated that:[24] 
It has been frequently recognised by this Board, and it may now be regarded as settled 
law, that according to the scheme of the British North America Act the enactments of the 
Parliament of Canada, in so far as these are within its competency, must override 
provincial legislation. But the Dominion Parliament has no authority conferred upon it 
by the Act to repeal directly any provincial statute, whether it does or does not come 
within the limits of jurisdiction prescribed by s. 92. The repeal of a provincial Act by the 
Parliament of Canada can only be effected by repugnancy between its provisions and the 
enactments of the Dominion. 
Should it be inferred from this passage, as some authors have,[25] that Parliament cannot 
amend or repeal the form and, more specifically, the wording of the C.C.L.C.? Is its 
power confined to the repeal of the normative content of the pre-Confederation 
provisions within its jurisdiction? Patenaude and Macdonald are also of the opinion that 
while the Quebec legislature is the only entity that can amend the form of the C.C.L.C., it 
has no authority to amend pre-Confederation provisions dealing with federal matters.[26] 
What conclusion have they drawn from this? According to Professor Macdonald, "it may 
be that the actual text of the articles of the Civil Code of Lower Canada that fall within 
federal jurisdiction may not be repealed explicitly by either legislature".[27] 
I believe that this is the correct approach. In my opinion, however, these two authors did 
not take their argument far enough. I feel that neither the federal Parliament nor the 
Quebec legislature can amend the form of the C.C.L.C. As noted by Lord Watson, a 
legislative body is not constitutionally authorized to repeal an enactment passed by 
another legislative body; the fact that the norm set out in the enactment is 
unconstitutional changes nothing. It need hardly be pointed out that the C.C.L.C. was 
enacted not by the Quebec legislature but by the legislature of the united province of 
Canada, and that the legislature of the province of Quebec is not, legally speaking, the 
legislature of the united province of Canada. The same is true of the federal Parliament. If 
the legislative body that passed a legislative provision is the only entity that can repeal its 
form, it must be concluded that it is impossible for the legislature of the province of 
Quebec to repeal even the form of the pre-Confederation provisions within its own 
jurisdiction that were enacted by the legislature of the united province of Canada. 
Should it therefore be concluded that neither of the two levels of government can repeal 
pre-Confederation law? I do not think so. The purpose of section 129 was to avoid a legal 
vacuum immediately after the Constitution came into effect. As Rand J. said so aptly in a 
decision that I will examine in a moment, this section "maintain[s] a continuity not of 
statutes but of laws, in the sense of distributive provisions which take their place in the 
one or other jurisdiction according to their subject matter".[28] All the law - and not just 
the "statutes" - was to continue in force until amended or repealed by the competent 
legislative body. Pre-Confederation statutes did not become federal or provincial statutes 
under section 129. In form, they never ceased to be, and will never cease to be, colonial 
statutes. The purpose of section 129 is therefore the continuation in force not of those 
pre-Confederation colonial statutes, but rather of the norms they express. This provision 
gives the competent level of government the power to repeal or amend that normative 
content, but not the form of the physical medium through which the norms were once 
expressed. The level of government that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a pre-
Confederation norm has the power to repeal that norm. 
I refer explicitly to a power to amend pre-Confederation norms because, in my opinion, 
there is a difference between such norms and the enactments that express them. The 
enactment is not the norm itself; it is no more than its physical medium.[29] Thus, for a 
legislative body, the power to repeal corresponds to the power to abolish or permanently 
eradicate a legal norm, which can occur without the physical medium being touched. It is 
not a matter of making a given provision inoperative pro tanto; rather, its normative 
existence is ended. 
It is true that the repeal of a statute generally presupposes the "express elimination of a 
statute".[30] On this subject, Professor Côté has stated that "when a statute is repealed, it 
disappears altogether".[31] Does this mean that the federal Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures cannot repeal pre-Confederation norms because they are unable to destroy the 
form of pre-Confederation statutes? Professor Côté's opinion must be qualified. In his 
description of the problem raised by the concept of repeal, he clearly did not have in 
mind the very specific situation created by section 129 of the Constitution. It is my 
opinion that repeal seeks to permanently eliminate a norm, which does not necessarily 
mean the elimination of its physical medium. Nonetheless, in such a situation, there is a 
repeal because the norm is permanently and not merely temporarily discarded. This is 
what distinguishes repeal, which is a method of extinguishing a norm, from 
inapplicability, which simply involves suspending the effect of the norm.[32] 
In practice, however, Parliament took for granted that it was entitled to amend or repeal 
not only the normative content, but also the actual form of the C.C.L.C. provisions that 
came within its jurisdiction.[33] The attitude of the commissioners responsible for 
revising the statutes of Quebec in 1888 also suggests that the province did not question 
this power.[34] 
However, the distinction I make between the power to repeal a norm and the power to 
destroy its form is not irrelevant. As will be seen in the next section, one level of 
government may have jurisdiction to permanently repeal a pre-Confederation norm 
without the expression of that norm disappearing. The enactment will continue to exist if 
it still acts as a medium for the pre-Confederation norm in its application to the other 
level of government. Once that level of government has also explicitly repealed the norm, 
then it will truly cease to exist. Such a situation has occurred in the past and deserves to 
be looked at for a moment. 
B. Problem raised by provisions that may fall within the jurisdiction of both levels 
of government 
Reference In re Bowater's Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd.[35] highlights a specific problem 
raised by section 129, namely the continuation in force, after a colony joins 
Confederation, of pre-Confederation provisions that may fall under both federal and 
provincial jurisdiction. It will be seen that in such a situation, Parliament or a provincial 
legislature can repeal the norm in question only if it relates to one of its heads of power. 
This decision also clarifies the more general question of how the power to amend or 
repeal pre-Confederation law is distributed. 
Prior to 1949, when Newfoundland joined Confederation, the Newfoundland government 
granted certain lands to Bowater's Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. by contract. Some tax 
advantages were also granted to the company, including income tax deductions and 
exemptions from customs and excise taxes. In return, the company agreed to invest 
several million dollars in the colony's industrial sector. The contracts were later 
confirmed by statutes passed by the colony. 
In the Supreme Court, the company argued that under Term 18(1) of the Terms of Union 
of Newfoundland with Canada,[36] the federal Parliament was bound by the tax 
exemptions recognized in the pre-Confederation statutes, despite the express repeal of the 
exemption provisions by a federal statute passed in 1949.[37] According to the company, 
Parliament could not repeal the provisions in question without the province's agreement. 
The basis for the argument was that the contracts and the statutes confirming them 
formed a closely interwoven set of provisions that fell under both federal and 
Newfoundland jurisdiction. The enactments were not severable from one another and 
therefore could be repealed only by agreement of the federal Parliament and the 
provincial legislature. Furthermore, since Parliament could not have enacted the pre-
Confederation statutes in question, it had to be concluded that it could not unilaterally 
repeal the tax exemption provisions of those statutes. This argument was, of course, 
based on Dobie. 
Six of the seven Supreme Court judges rejected the company's argument. Rinfret C.J. 
expressed the view that the legislative body with jurisdiction to regulate the matter dealt 
with in the pre-Confederation provisions was the body that could repeal the 
provisions.[38] As noted above,[39] he refused to rule on the question of whether pre-
Confederation provisions relating to federal matters continued to apply after 
Newfoundland joined Confederation.[40] He was of the view that the federal income tax 
legislation had permanently repealed the pre-Confederation provisions.[41] However, he 
acknowledged that the tax exemptions could still be relied on by the company in its 
dealings with the provincial tax authorities.[42] 
Kerwin J. stated that Dobie could be distinguished because, in that case, the provisions of 
the pre-Confederation statute in question were truly indivisible, which was not the case 
here.[43] In any event, however - he seemed to say in a passage that is somewhat 
ambiguous - it was not necessary to determine whether Parliament could repeal the pre-
Confederation provisions in question. Since Parliament certainly had authority to 
legislate concerning tax exemptions, as it did in sections 49 and 50 of the 1949 income 
tax legislation, those provisions superseded the pre-Confederation statutes.[44] 
In my opinion, the most interesting view of this question is that of Rand J., who found 
that pre-Confederation law whose subject matter comes under federal jurisdiction at the 
time of Union continues to apply as long as Ottawa does not intervene.[45] He then 
added that "the effect of . . . s. 129 of the British North America Act is to maintain a 
continuity not of statutes but of laws, in the sense of distributive provisions which take 
their place in the one or other jurisdiction according to their subject matter . . . and that 
modification of the continued laws may be by repeal or amendment or by way of 
repugnant enactment."[46] Thus, while it was true that the provisions in question were 
not severable when considered as part of an indivisible contract, they were when 
considered as legislative subject matters.[47] According to the judge, the determination 
of which legislative body could amend the pre-Confederation provisions did not require 
that the amendment's impact on the content of the contract be considered; in his opinion, 
the determining factor was the matter to which the provisions related.[48] It is important 
to note that the provisions in question were, in the judge's opinion, "as severable as if 
they were contained in another statute".[49] Federal intervention, according to him, was 
therefore completely valid. Locke J. shared that opinion. As he saw it, Dobie had to be 
interpreted as authorizing each level of government to legislate in respect of pre-
Confederation provisions that fell within its jurisdiction. Since Parliament had 
jurisdiction to grant exemptions from federal taxes, it was authorized to legislate no 
matter what the consequences might be for the contracts.[50]  
Kellock J. gave reasons similar to those of his colleague Rand J. In his opinion, neither 
the federal Parliament nor a province can repeal, either expressly or by implication, a 
provision that is not within its jurisdiction.[51] Although he felt that in this case there was 
no express repeal, the pre-Confederation provisions in question were nonetheless 
"altered" or "abolished" by the passage of the federal income tax legislation.[52] There 
was no question that the provisions in issue related to a federal matter and that Ottawa 
had the power to legislate.[53] 
Estey J. reaffirmed that the power to repeal a pre-Confederation provision belongs to the 
level of government that has the power to enact an identical provision.[54] There was no 
doubt that the Newfoundland legislature could have repealed the portion of the pre-
Confederation statutes in question that fell within provincial jurisdiction.[55] As for the 
argument that the provisions were not severable, the judge stated that, in so far as a pre-
Confederation statute contains provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of both levels of 
government, each level must intervene in relation to the provisions over which it has 
jurisdiction, even if that may cause some practical problems:[56] 
[T]he fact that such legislative action on the part of one or the other [level of government] 
may create difficulties to be subsequently dealt with does not affect the question of 
jurisdiction. Whatever such difficulties may be will no doubt in due course be dealt with 
by the appropriate authorities, but those are not matters to be dealt with by the courts, 
particularly when as here, this court is called upon to determine only the question of 
jurisdiction. Under the scheme of Confederation and under the terms of Union even if the 
'rights and obligations are inextricably interwoven into a single Newfoundland law' as 
here contended, that would not alter or affect the legislative classification of the various 
portions of Bowater's Law nor the Jurisdiction of either the Dominion or the province to 
deal therewith. 
Finally, Taschereau J., in dissent, was of the opinion that the provisions in question were 
still in force as if the Union had not taken place[57] but that the federal Parliament could 
not repeal them unilaterally since they were too closely linked to the provisions that were 
within provincial jurisdiction.[58] He added: "the Dominion cannot legislate in any way 
to modify these inseverable statutes in such a way that their purpose would be defeated, 
for the reason that it could not, in view of the divided legislative power attributed by the 
B.N.A. Act, directly enact them."[59]  
To summarize, this decision once again confirms that the provisions of pre-Confederation 
statutes must be repealed or amended by the level of government that has jurisdiction 
over the matter to which they relate. As Rand J. noted, section 129 provides for the 
continuity of the pre-Confederation normative content and not simply of pre-
Confederation statutes. It is the subject matter of a rule of law that is important. The 
identification of the level of government that has the power to amend or repeal pre-
Confederation law therefore requires a characterization of the "pith and substance", the 
"dominant characteristic" or, in short, the matter to which the pre-Confederation 
provision in question relates. Bowater also leads to the conclusion that it is of little 
importance that the general meaning of a pre-Confederation statute is altered by the 
unilateral action of one of the two levels of government in relation to provisions that are 
within its jurisdiction. 
This decision also raises an issue that had not arisen in any earlier case. Which level of 
government has jurisdiction to amend or repeal a pre-Confederation provision that may 
fall within both federal and provincial areas of jurisdiction? Who has the power to amend 
or repeal a provision that can be said to have a double aspect? 
In Bowater, Rand J. stated that the pre-Confederation provisions in question were "as 
severable as if they were contained in another statute".[60] This was possibly true for the 
customs and excise tax exemptions, which were solely within federal jurisdiction. But 
what about the income tax deductions? Both levels of government have jurisdiction in 
this area under subsections 91(3) and 92(2) of the Constitution. This means that the same 
pre-Confederation provisions might have been applicable in both federal and provincial 
areas of jurisdiction. 
In Bowater, the majority held that Parliament could certainly repeal the legal norm 
concerning tax exemptions for its own purposes. The Court therefore acknowledged, at 
least implicitly, that there is a distinction between a legal norm and the physical medium 
that expresses it, namely an enactment. Parliament has jurisdiction in relation to a norm 
only in so far as the norm falls under a federal head of power. However, its action cannot 
eliminate the enactment, since the norm continues to apply in provincial matters. Chief 
Justice Rinfret understood this problem very well when he stated: 
It seems to me, therefore, abundantly clear, upon the union taking place, customs and 
excise duties being properly in the domain of the Parliament of Canada, that Parliament 
became the only competent body to legislate in regard to them throughout Canada, 
including Newfoundland. . . . As for taxes, and amongst them, income taxes or income 
war taxes, the situation is somewhat different for both the Parliament and the Legislatures 
have been given the power to tax. I would not doubt that the exemptions in respect of 
taxes remain in force for the benefit of the Bowater's Newfoundland Pulp and Paper 
Mills, Ltd., in so far as they apply to provincial taxes; but these exemptions, if sought to 
be invoked as against federal taxes, can of course have no effect and they become 
inoperative.[61] 
The legal norm is therefore permanently repealed as far as its application to the federal 
sphere is concerned, but the repeal does not have the effect of removing the enactment 
from the statute books, since the norm continues to apply in the provincial sphere. 
An analogous situation arose in McGee v. The King [62]. In that case, an Upper Canada 
statute provided that a person could acquire a right of way over Crown lands by using the 
way uninterruptedly for twenty years. It was argued that the statute was enforceable 
against the federal Crown. When the Revised Statutes of Ontario had been enacted in 
1877, the province of Ontario had repealed and replaced the statute in question.[63] 
However, the repealing provision in the R.S.O. expressly stated[64] that it did not apply 
to pre-Confederation legislative provisions that were within federal jurisdiction under the 
1867 Constitution. The judge therefore held that since Parliament had not repealed the 
prescription provisions, they could still be relied on against the federal Crown.[65] Thus, 
the provincial repeal eliminated the pre-Confederation norm only in so far as it related to 
a provincial matter. 
The preceding discussion is not without relevance to this report, since it is possible, as 
will be seen below, to argue that some C.C.L.C. provisions relating to negotiable 
instruments have both a federal aspect and a provincial aspect. If that is the case, it seems 
preferable to me for both levels of government to take action to repeal the pre-
Confederation norm in its entirety. 
C. Specific problem of implied repeal 
There is no doubt that the federal Parliament can expressly repeal a pre-Confederation 
norm that falls within its jurisdiction. However, I am not convinced that it can alter the 
form of the legislative provision that expresses the norm. Be that as it may, the question 
remains as to whether it can implicitly repeal a pre-Confederation norm by enacting a 
provision that clearly goes against the purpose of that norm. 
This question is important because repeal does not make the pre-Confederation provision 
simply inoperative pro tanto;[66] it destroys its existence. Only express legislative 
intervention could resurrect such a provision. Furthermore, this question is highly 
relevant to this report because, as will be seen, some authors argue that the C.C.L.C. 
articles on evidence in relation to negotiable instruments were implicitly repealed by 
Parliament when it passedthe Canada Evidence Act.[67] In my opinion, only an express 
repeal can permanently eliminate a legal norm. Nonetheless, I must admit that there is a 
minority trend among the courts that does not share my opinion. I will look at that trend 
before setting out my own point of view. 
In Bowater, for example, Kellock J. seemed to state that a repeal could be implied. He 
stated:[68] "If Parliament cannot enact, it cannot repeal, no matter whether the attempted 
mode is by express repeal or by the enactment of repugnant legislation." However, he did 
not elaborate on this point. The question of the implied repeal of a pre-Confederation 
provision was, however, directly addressed in Holmstead v. Minister of Customs and 
Excise.[69] That case, like Bowater, concerned a pre-Confederation statute that granted a 
tax exemption to an individual. A statute of the united province of Canada passed in 1849 
and amended in 1859, which was applicable only in Upper Canada, provided that the 
salary paid to the registrar of the Court of Chancery of Upper Canada was "free and clear 
from all taxes and deductions". The plaintiff argued that he could deduct the tax 
exemption granted to him by the statute from the tax he had to pay the federal 
government. Audette J. rejected that argument. 
He stated that tax exemptions are privileges that cannot continue to exist following a 
change in the constitution of a political community.[70] He also said that section 129 
authorizes the implied repeal of pre-Confederation provisions. Section 129 states that pre-
Confederation law is continued in force "except as otherwise provided by this Act". 
According to the judge, since subsection 91(3) of the Constitution grants Parliament an 
exclusive taxation power and since, in compliance with that provision, Parliament passed 
income tax legislation in 1917, "therefore, by necessary implication and intendment, the 
enactment for exemption of that salary in Ontario has been repealed. . . That exemption 
became obsolete and void by mere operation of law, under sec. 129 of the B.N.A. 
Act."[71] At the very end of his judgment, Audette J. stated:[72] 
[A] later Act which confers new rights such as the B.N.A. Act, repeals by necessary 
implication and intendment an earlier Act governing the same subject matter if the co-
existence of the right which the latter gave would be productive of inconvenience, for the 
just inference from such a result would be that the legislature intended to take the earlier 
right away. Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes, 5th ed., p. 294[:] "An intention to 
repeal an Act may be gathered from its repugnancy to the general course of subsequent 
legislation." 
In my opinion, the approach taken by Audette J. seems very questionable. It would have 
been preferable to state that the pre-Confederation norm was inoperative because it was 
repugnant to the purpose of the 1917 federal income tax legislation.[73] I share Professor 
Côté's opinion that there is no such thing as an implied or implicit repeal.[74] It is true 
that the Supreme Court has used that term at times.[75] However, when Parliament 
passes a provision that conflicts with a previous federal norm, the norm is not implicitly 
repealed, but is rather inoperative for as long as the conflict subsists. For a pre-
Confederation norm to be repealed, the legislative body must have expressly stated its 
intention to repeal it permanently. If it has merely passed a provision that conflicts with a 
pre-Confederation norm, there is no basis for concluding that the norm has been 
permanently discarded. 
I will, however, keep this debate in mind when making my recommendations. 
II. - IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT ENTITLED TO 
AMEND OR REPEAL PRE-CONFEDERATION PROVISIONS OF THE C.C.L.C. 
RELATING TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND INTEREST  
There are several stages involved in determining whether the federal Parliament or the 
province of Quebec has the power to amend the pre-Confederation provisions of the 
C.C.L.C. relating to negotiable instruments and interest. First, the specific characteristics 
of the distribution of powers in the area of private law, as effected by sections 91 and 92 
of the Constitution, must be examined (A). Once the various interpretations of the 
concept of exclusivity of jurisdiction have been reviewed (A.1), I will look at the 
fundamental provincial jurisdiction in the area of private law (A.2) and analyse the 
exceptional federal power in that same field, more specifically as regards negotiable 
instruments and interest (A.3). 
Once the provisions that may be problematic have been identified, I will be able to 
express an informed opinion on the power of the Quebec legislature to repeal them 
unilaterally, as it did in 1991 (B.2). In light of the result of my analysis, recommendations 
can then be made (C.3). 
A. Examination of the specific relationship between provincial and federal 
jurisdiction in the area of private law  
Before more specifically examining the scope of provincial power in relation to private 
law and the federal power in relation to negotiable instruments and interest, I must briefly 
look at the meaning given to the concept of "exclusivity" in Canadian constitutional law. 
Without a good understanding of what is meant by that term, I will not be able to 
properly formulate an opinion on the legality of the Quebec legislature's repeal of the 
C.C.L.C. articles on negotiable instruments and interest. 
1. Exclusivity of jurisdiction: a question of legislative purposes, not legislative spheres 
Sections 91 and 92 expressly grant each level of government the exclusive power to 
legislate in relation to certain matters. The courts were quick to recognize that because of 
this exclusivity of legislative jurisdiction, the failure by one level of government to 
exercise one of its powers under the Constitution does not authorize the other level to do 
so instead.[76] It is also agreed that sections 91 and 92 recognize the existence of 
categories of law, not of facts.[77] Those sections grant legislative jurisdiction in relation 
to certain matters within the enumerated classes of subjects. It is not the matters or 
subjects themselves that are granted. In short, exclusivity is a concept that has to do with 
the types of legislative purposes that can be fulfilled by exercising a given power. 
However, it must be noted that the concept of exclusivity of jurisdiction has evolved. 
This fluctuation in the meaning given by judges to the concept of exclusivity has a great 
deal to do with their "pre-understanding"[78] of their role and, more specifically, their 
view of federalism.[79] Without going into detail, it can be said that two major concepts 
of exclusivity have come into conflict, and continue to come into conflict,[80] in 
Canadian constitutional law: the "watertight compartments" doctrine and the "aspect" 
doctrine. 
The watertight compartments doctrine, which for a long time prevailed, is a legal 
approach characterized by a reluctance to acknowledge that the fields of jurisdiction of 
the two levels of government may overlap.[81] This approach accentuates the 
compartmentalization of fields of jurisdiction. Since this approach is overly restrictive for 
the two levels of government, the courts developed the "ancillary power" doctrine, which 
allows for encroachment where necessary for the effective exercise of a given power.[82] 
This traditional approach first requires that the exclusive content of a jurisdiction be 
identified. This makes it possible to determine whether an encroachment is necessarily 
incidental to the exercise of the jurisdiction. In contrast, it will be seen that the aspect 
doctrine emphasizes the purpose to be achieved by a statute much more than the 
exclusive content of the jurisdiction relied on to support its validity. However, it will also 
be seen that the aspect doctrine does not completely eliminate the duty to assess the scope 
of the exclusive power involved in a field of jurisdiction. 
The watertight compartments doctrine now seems to have given way to the aspect 
doctrine, also called the "pith and substance" doctrine.[83] According to that doctrine, "a 
law which is federal in its true nature will be upheld even if it affects matters which 
appear to be a proper subject for provincial legislation (and vice versa)".[84] This 
approach encourages the "overlap of legislation"[85] rather than watertight 
compartmentalization. As long as the main object - or dominant characteristic - of a 
provincial statute is to achieve a legislative purpose that falls within one of the heads of 
power listed in section 92 of the Constitution, the statute will not be found 
unconstitutional even if it has a slight impact on an area of federal law. The question of 
whether the statute also has a federal aspect becomes irrelevant.[86] Conversely, a federal 
statute whose main purpose is within the legislative authority of Parliament under section 
91 of the Constitution is not unconstitutional simply because it may affect an area of 
provincial jurisdiction. 
What happens, though, when a statute relates to a subject that falls under a head of 
federal jurisdiction when looked at from one angle and a head of provincial jurisdiction 
when looked at from another angle? In such a case, the courts say that the subject has a 
"double aspect". Legislation on such a subject can therefore be passed by either 
Parliament or a province, in so far as each is pursuing a purpose that is within its 
jurisdiction.[87] 
The aspect doctrine and its corollary, the double aspect doctrine, are both the expression 
of a certain form of judicial reticence. The courts generally favour an approach that 
enables statutes to be found constitutional.[88] When the double aspect doctrine is 
applied, federal and provincial norms on the same subject can both subsist. To resolve the 
conflicts that may result from the simultaneous application of the statutes in question, the 
courts apply the rule of federal paramountcy,[89] according to which any provincial 
statute that conflicts with a federal statute becomes inoperative.[90] 
However, the aspect doctrine must not serve to endanger the rule of exclusive jurisdiction 
explicitly recognized in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution. It must not deny that 
exclusivity. On the contrary, it "can only be invoked when it gives effect to the rule of 
exclusive fields of jurisdiction".[91] Thus, it can be applied only when the multiplicity of 
aspects is real.[92] In Bell Canada v. CCST,[93] Beetz J. noted that the double aspect 
doctrine must be applied with caution: 
The reason for this caution is the extremely broad wording of the exclusive legislative 
powers listed in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the risk that these two 
fields of exclusive powers will be combined into a single more or less concurrent field of 
powers governed solely by the rule of paramountcy of federal legislation. 
Another concept was developed by the courts to limit the scope of the aspect doctrine in 
cases where it applies. It is the "interjurisdictional immunity" concept, also known as the 
"intrinsic elements" doctrine. According to that concept, Parliament's exclusive power in 
a given field of jurisdiction is deemed to include all the "essential and vital elements"[94] 
of that jurisdiction. A valid provincial statute of general application that interfered with 
those elements would be deemed to bear on the "specifically federal nature of the 
jurisdiction".[95] It would thus interfere with the "basic, minimum and unassailable 
content"[96] of the jurisdiction. The rule of exclusive jurisdiction would prohibit its 
application,[97] since the provincial statute would be authorizing a prohibited 
encroachment.[98] It is true, as authors such as Peter Hogg [99] have noted, that the 
"specifically federal nature" concept is hard to reconcile with a pure aspect doctrine. 
Nonetheless, its recognition is necessary if we are to avoid transforming exclusive federal 
and provincial fields of jurisdiction into "concurrent fields of jurisdiction, such as 
agriculture, immigration and old age pensions and supplementary benefits, in which 
Parliament and the legislatures may legislate on the same aspect".[100] There is therefore 
a relationship of similarity between "exclusive legislative power", "exclusive legislative 
purpose" and "specifically federal content". Although the interjurisdictional immunity 
doctrine was developed in the context of federal jurisdiction over undertakings and 
incorporation, there is no reason why it cannot apply in other federal spheres.[101] 
In short, what must be stressed is that whatever approach is taken - the "watertight 
compartments" doctrine or the "aspect" doctrine - it is always necessary to determine the 
scope of the exclusive power conferred under a given head of jurisdiction. I will now 
define what falls under exclusive provincial jurisdiction in the area of private law under 
subsection 92(13) and what falls under exclusive federal jurisdiction in relation to 
negotiable instruments and interest under subsections 91(18) and 91(19). 
2. Private law: a fundamental provincial jurisdiction 
In a 1992 study,[102] I traced the history of federal jurisdiction over negotiable 
instruments. I also looked at the scope of subsection 92(13) of the Constitution, which 
provides that "property and civil rights" are within provincial jurisdiction. That analysis 
clearly demonstrated the general nature of provincial jurisdiction in the area of private 
law and the very exceptional nature of federal jurisdiction in that area. 
I will briefly summarize my findings in that study. First, an examination of Citizens 
Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons[103] and of the origins of the 1867 
Constitution leads to the conclusion that subsection 92(13) should be very liberally 
construed; the expression "property and civil rights" should be understood as broadly as 
possible. The purpose of that provision has been interpreted as being to grant the 
provinces a fundamental jurisdiction in matters of private law. Professor Hogg, for 
example, defines "property and civil rights" as follows: "a compendious description of 
the entire body of private law which governs the relationships between subject and 
subject, as opposed to the law which governs the relationships between the subject and 
the institutions of government".[104] It has been said that this expression thus designates 
all existing rules of law, with the exception of rules of criminal law and rules that govern 
the exercise of sovereignty by the King of England.[105] 
This means that the matters listed in section 91 of the Constitution are not, as former 
Chief Justice Laskin argued when he was a professor [106] mere illustrations of 
Parliament's general power to legislate set out in the introductory paragraph of that 
provision. In reality, if the powers listed below had not been specifically assigned to the 
Parliament of Canada under subsections 91(2), (15), (16), (18-19), (21-23) and (28), they 
would be within provincial jurisdiction under subsection 92(13) of the Constitution:[107] 
the regulation of trade and commerce, banking, the incorporation of banks, savings 
banks, bills of exchange and promissory notes, interest, bankruptcy and insolvency, 
patents of invention and discovery, copyrights and, finally, the establishment, 
maintenance and management of penitentiaries. As noted by Professor Lederman, the 
"notwithstanding" provision found in the introductory paragraph of section 91 clearly 
shows that the enumerated heads of power, in so far as they have to do with property and 
civil rights, are deemed to be withdrawn from the historic scope of subsection 
92(13).[108] It also follows that the jurisdiction conferred on Parliament in the area of 
private law is exceptional in nature. 
To summarize, it can be said with no fear of error that subsection 92(13) authorizes the 
provinces to legislate in all fields of private law. They therefore have the power to 
develop the [Translation] "jus commune",[109] "a given body of norms [that] apply [in 
private matters] unless there is an express exception".[110] It should be noted that 
subsection 92(14) also grants the provinces the power to regulate procedure in provincial 
matters[111] and the administration of justice in the province. 
However, there is an important limitation on this fundamental provincial jurisdiction in 
the area of private law. The provinces are not authorized to pursue legislative purposes 
that have been exceptionally and specifically assigned to the federal Parliament. It 
follows that the actual scope of subsection 92(13) varies, depending on the interpretation 
given by the courts and academic writers to the private law heads of power listed in 
section 91 of the Constitution. 
I will now look at two of those exceptional federal heads of power in the area of private 
law, namely negotiable instruments and interest. 
3. Exceptional nature of the federal private law power 
Federal jurisdiction in relation to private law is therefore exceptional in nature. By 
examining Parliament's jurisdiction over bills of exchange, notes, cheques and interest, I 
will be able to highlight the two consequences that flow from this situation. First, it will 
be seen that Parliament's exclusive power in relation to these matters is very limited but 
that its ancillary power is considerable. Second, it will be seen that the fundamental 
provincial jurisdiction in the area of private law, combined with the very limited scope of 
the exclusive federal power over negotiable instruments and interest, explains why the 
courts have found that the provinces have a very broad power to act in relation to these 
matters. 
(i) Scope of federal jurisdiction over negotiable instruments[112] 
(a) Scope of the exclusive power 
Up to this point, we have seen that sections 91 and 92 provide for a distribution of the 
legislative purposes that can be pursued and that a certain number of exclusive purposes 
is linked to each enumerated head of power. Furthermore, as I attempted to illustrate in a 
recent study,[113] while the various subsections of these two sections all confer 
legislative powers in the manner I have just indicated, this does not necessarily mean that 
all of those powers are of the same nature. In my opinion, the scope of the exclusive 
legislative purposes encompassed by each head of power depends on the intrinsic nature 
of the power in question. It follows that the degree of exclusivity of the various federal 
powers varies from one power to another.[114] Finally, the approaches used to determine 
which legislative purposes are encompassed by a given head of power also vary with the 
nature of the power. 
What about federal jurisdiction over bills of exchange and promissory notes? What is the 
scope of Parliament's exclusive and ancillary powers over these matters? To properly 
answer this question, it is necessary to determine the specific nature of federal 
jurisdiction over negotiable instruments. Subsections 91(18) and 92(13) of the 
Constitution both have the following very important characteristic: they both grant a 
power of the same nature. Each subsection gives one of the two levels of government 
jurisdiction in the area of private law. Yet unlike rail transportation, for example, private 
law is not a matter that can be divided according to physical or geographic criteria. It 
involves overlap much more than exclusion. What characterizes private law is precisely 
the unity and intermingling of its parts. 
Thus, to determine the scope of the exclusive federal legislative power, it is necessary to 
identify the defining aspects of a negotiable instrument. It comes down to the 
identification of the aspects of the law of negotiable instruments that can be regulated 
only by Parliament pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on it by subsection 91(18) of the 
Constitution. 
The historical approach I used to demonstrate that the provinces have fundamental 
jurisdiction in the area of private law under subsection 92(13) also highlighted the 
exceptional nature of federal jurisdiction in that area.[115] I also concluded from my 
research that in 1867, the exclusive jurisdiction that was to be assigned to Parliament in 
relation to negotiable instruments was limited to the power to legislate concerning the 
contractual aspects that distinguish those agreements from other contracts. Thus, it is not 
the negotiable instrument itself - or any legal rule that may be related to it - that falls 
under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Only the specific legal rules that make such an 
instrument a negotiable instrument by endorsement, and that can be grouped under the 
term "law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense",[116] fall under exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. Included among those rules are all the rules concerning the negotiation and 
form of a negotiable instrument. As Caron and Bohémier put it, the federal government 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters: [Translation] "conditions for the 
formation and negotiability of instruments, the rights and obligations of the parties, the 
types of holders and the privileges granted to each of them".[117] Since the rules in 
question form part of the exclusive content of federal jurisdiction under subsection 
91(18), no provincial statute, even one of general application, could validly deal with 
those matters even if there were no federal statute on the subject.[118] In any event, 
provincial legislation that sought to remedy problems presented by the negotiation or 
form of a negotiable instrument could not be characterized as legislation of general 
application.[119] 
However, which norms will apply if federal legislation is silent about a matter that does 
not form part of the exclusive federal content, but rather falls under the law of negotiable 
instruments in a wide sense? Since Parliament's jurisdiction under subsection 91(18) 
relates to a private law contract,[120] and since the provinces have fundamental 
jurisdiction in relation to private law under subsection 92(13), general civil law rules will 
fill in the gaps in federal legislation on bills of exchange. As Professor Bohémier has 
noted:[121] [Translation] "the Bills of Exchange Act is legislation that is subsidiary to the 
civil law. The purpose of the law of negotiable instruments is not to alter or circumvent 
the general rules of the jus commune. Its aim is simply to promote the circulation of 
negotiable instruments by ensuring their negotiability. That is why the bills of exchange 
legislation must be consistent with basic civil law rules." 
In short, validly enacted provincial provisions on contracts or civil procedure - provisions 
that are presumed not to have any effect on the law of negotiable instruments in a strict 
sense - can certainly apply to the agreement that a negotiable instrument constitutes, 
unless there is an operational conflict. Where there is such a conflict, the provincial 
statute remains valid but is deemed inoperative to the extent of the conflict.[122] 
Constitutional litigation reinforces the above propositions. The courts have, at least 
implicitly, acknowledged the very symbiotic nature of the field of private law. Their 
approach has also been to confine the exclusive content of federal jurisdiction to the "law 
of negotiable instruments in a strict sense". In this way, they have authorized a very 
generous application of provincial legislation in matters concerning bills of exchange and 
notes. However, they will intervene if a provincial statute touches on the minimum 
essential content of federal jurisdiction over negotiable instruments. Attorney General for 
Alberta and Winstanley v. Atlas Lumber Co. Ltd.[123] is a good illustration of this. 
In that case, the plaintiff-respondent sued Winstanley to recover on a promissory note. In 
defence, the appellant argued that unless Atlas Lumber held a permit for the recovery of 
money, as required by section 8 of the Debt Adjustment Act,[124] it did not have the right 
to sue. The permit in question had to be issued by a provincial board. The respondent 
argued that section 8 was unconstitutional. 
All the Supreme Court judges found that the impugned provision was inoperative. Duff 
C.J. and Kerwin J. concluded that section 8 of the provincial Act was in direct conflict 
with the unqualified right granted by the Bills of Exchange Act to the holder of a 
negotiable instrument to sue the maker and endorsers of the instrument. Rinfret J. was of 
the view that the effect of the challenged provision was to give a provincial 
administrative body an absolute and purely discretionary power to decide whether to 
grant or deny a permit that gave access to the courts, which was necessary for a creditor 
wishing to recover a debt. In his opinion, the effect of such a provision was therefore to 
deprive the holder of a note of the privileges conferred by the federal Bills of Exchange 
Act: 
The prohibition goes to the right to sue. It has nothing to do with mere procedure. The 
right to bring an action is not procedure; it is a substantive right.[125] 
. . . 
[T]he right to sue, or to enforce payment, or to recover on a bill or note is of the very 
essence of bills of exchange; it is one of the essential characteristics of a bill or of a 
promissory note. The matter falls within the strict limits of sub-head 18 of sec. 91. It 
flows from the provisions establishing negotiability, which has become the primary 
quality of a bill or note and in which consist the true character and nature of these 
instruments. 
The provisions relating to the right to sue, to enforce payment and to recover before the 
courts are not incidental provisions; they are, in truth, the very pith and substance of the 
statute. 
. . . 
The effect is to destroy the value of the negotiability of the bill or note and to deprive the 
holder of a bill or note of the right and power to sue and enforce payment and recover, 
which are conferred upon him by the Bills of Exchange Act.[126] 
Hudson, Taschereau and Davis JJ. were all of the opinion that a province could not 
impose extrajudicial control over rights of action created under a federal statute.[127] 
However, provided there is no such interference with a matter that falls under the law of 
negotiable instruments in a strict sense, provincial statutes do apply to bills of exchange 
and notes. The entire problem, of course, lies in determining what falls under the law of 
negotiable instruments in a strict sense. I will come back to this question in Part II.B.1. 
If a provincial statute is not directed at a matter that falls under the law of negotiable 
instruments in a strict sense, it can refer expressly to negotiable instruments. Several 
decisions confirm this. 
In Duplain v. Cameron,[128] a Saskatchewan statute[129] required all persons trading in 
securities to register with an administrative body. Duplain had sold promissory notes that 
matured less than one year from the date of issue. Under paragraph 20(2)(f) of the 
challenged statute, only a registered salesman could negotiate such an instrument. After 
the transactions in question, and as a result of acts that were not set out in the record, the 
provincial commission cancelled the appellant's registration as a salesman. Duplain then 
ran the risk of having penal sanctions imposed on him if he attempted to negotiate the 
instruments. His main argument was that the impugned statute dealt with a subject that 
fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, namely bills of exchange and 
promissory notes. 
Kerwin C.J.[130]rejected Duplain's arguments on the ground that the impugned statute 
related to the regulation of trading in securities and was therefore not directed at 
negotiable instruments.[131] This case,[132] he said, could be distinguished from Atlas 
Lumber because in this case the holder's right of action was not denied by the statute. 
There was nothing to prevent the holder of "Promissory Notes and Collateral Covenants" 
from suing the makers of those documents. As for Cartwright J., he was of the view that 
the provincial statute was valid and applicable because it did not alter the nature or 
character of the note.[133] 
Thus, it can be seen that the judges of the Supreme Court are concerned with identifying 
what differentiates the contract that a bill of exchange constitutes from other agreements. 
It is all a question of purpose. The fact that negotiable instruments are referred to in a 
provincial statute does not necessarily mean that the statute is invalid. As long as the 
provincial statute does not affect the "form, content, validity or enforceability of 
promissory notes"[134] - the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense - it will be 
applicable, since it will not frustrate the intention of Parliament. 
The same circumspect attitude was adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal in 127097 
Canada Ltd. v. Québec (P.G. du Québec).[135] In that case, the appellant challenged the 
validity of section 251 of the Consumer Protection Act,[136] which prohibited imposing 
a charge for cashing a cheque issued by the government of Canada or Quebec or by a 
municipal corporation. The Act therefore expressly covered negotiable instruments. The 
appellant argued that the Act interfered with the negotiability of negotiable instruments 
because it had the effect of fixing the price at which such an instrument had to be 
negotiated. 
Gendreau J.A.[137]held that the challenged Act was directed at the protection of 
consumers - a matter within provincial jurisdiction - and that section 251 validly 
prohibited a [Translation] "socially unacceptable trade practice", namely the imposition 
of a charge by a person who is well aware that a cheque issued by a government will be 
promptly and completely honoured.[138] 
The Court then noted that the negotiability of a bill of exchange, within the meaning of 
the Bills of Exchange Act, [Translation] "is the right and capacity to ... assign and transfer 
[the bill of exchange] so that its holder can enforce it in his or her own name against all 
those bound by it";[139] it is [Translation] "characterized by the right of the holder to 
enforce the instrument in his or her own name against all those bound by it and also by 
the right of a holder in due course to take the bill of exchange free from all defects".[140] 
The judge then stated that the challenged section did not affect the law of negotiable 
instruments "in the strict sense" and did not interfere with the negotiability of a cheque. It 
was directed only at persons running a cheque-cashing business and prohibited them from 
imposing a charge; according to the judge, [Translation] "the form, validity and 
enforcement of the cheque continue to be governed exclusively by the Bills of Exchange 
Act".[141] 
While it was true to say that [Translation] "if the word 'negotiation' is taken in its broad, 
ordinary sense, section 251 affects the transfer or acquisition of a cheque",[142] there 
was no conflict because negotiability within the meaning of the federal Act was not 
affected. The Court therefore held that the Act was intra vires the province.[143]  
Red River Forest Products Inc. v. Ferguson[144] also demonstrates that legislation of 
specific application that falls within provincial jurisdiction, that is, a law which expressly 
applies to negotiable instruments will not necessarily be found unconstitutional. In that 
case, the respondent refused to honour a note that he had given in payment of a gambling 
debt. He argued that an English statute, the 1835 Gaming Act,[145] which provided that a 
gambling debt could not be the lawful consideration for a bill of exchange, was part of 
Manitoba law. In defence, the appellant argued that the Act [146] was inoperative 
because it conflicted with the Bills of Exchange Act:[147] "the [Gaming Act] provision 
touches upon enforceability of bills of exchange, and is therefore ultra vires the 
province". 
Helper J.A.[148] rejected that argument. First of all, he noted that in Atlas Lumber, on 
which the appellant was relying, Rinfret J. had ruled on the ability to institute an action, 
not on the capacity to contract.[149] Furthermore, he felt that the Gaming Act did not 
concern a matter that fell under the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense. In his 
opinion, the reasoning adopted in McGillis v. Sullivan [150]was applicable. In that case, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that the Ontario Gaming Act [151] was not 
unconstitutional even though section 2 of the Act - which was identical to the section in 
issue in Ferguson - specifically referred to negotiable instruments. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal decided that the Ontario Gaming Act was not a statute in relation to bills of 
exchange and notes. Rather, it was directed at the regulation of gaming and betting, 
which was within provincial jurisdiction. Relying on that decision, Helper J.A. stated in 
Ferguson that the Gaming Act "did not prevent or prohibit the use of such instruments or 
destroy their value in the hands of persons other than the winner of money or other 
valuable thing described in the enactment . . . It dealt only with the rights and relationship 
between the loser and the winner in a gaming transaction. It did not extend to third 
persons and therefore did not infringe upon the federal legislation dealing with holders in 
due course."[152] The Act was therefore applicable to negotiable instruments. 
In an attempt to explain the Manitoba Court of Appeal's reasoning in Ferguson, Professor 
Geva[153] has stated: "one could perhaps . . . conclude that even provincial legislation 
that relates specifically and exclusively to bills and notes is good law, as long as it 
addresses 'wide sense' matters and is not inconsistent with federal law". 
To summarize, it can be said that the extremely limited scope given to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over negotiable instruments has allowed for a very broad application of 
provincial private law, even when it is directed at such instruments. At the risk of 
repeating myself, that application is possible only if the provincial statute, in seeking to 
achieve a purpose falling within one of the heads of power listed in section 92, does not 
touch on an element of the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense. In addition to 
meeting this first criterion, the provincial statute must not conflict with a valid federal 
provision.[154] In other words, it can be said that matters falling under the law of 
negotiable instruments in a wide sense may have a double aspect. Thus, in Ferguson, the 
question of whether a gambling debt could be the lawful consideration for a bill of 
exchange had a provincial aspect, because the provinces have jurisdiction to regulate 
contracts in general and gambling debts specifically. It also had a federal aspect, because 
it concerned the lawfulness of a bill of exchange. That federal aspect would authorize 
Parliament to legislate on the same subject. 
Up to this point, I have noted that the entire problem lies in distinguishing what falls 
under the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense from what falls under the law of 
negotiable instruments in a wide sense. I will address that problem when I examine the 
pre-Confederation provisions of the C.C.L.C. relating to negotiable instruments (II.B.1). 
It is now essential to assess the scope of the ancillary power that Parliament can exercise 
under subsection 91(18). 
(b) Scope of the ancillary power 
Should the approach described above, which involves limiting Parliament's exclusive 
power in relation to negotiable instruments and bills of exchange to a very narrow sphere, 
affect the assessment of its ancillary power in that area in the same manner? I do not 
think so. Rather, I believe that the specific relationship between federal and provincial 
powers in the area of private law must lead to a recognition that Parliament has a wide 
trenching power as part of its jurisdiction over bills of exchange and notes. 
Because of the interaction between the private law powers assigned to the provinces and 
Ottawa,[155] the test of "fit" to be applied to justify an encroachment could prove to be 
very flexible.[156] Thus, even though the legislative purposes that only Parliament can 
pursue are very limited, Parliament has a very invasive ancillary power. The 
homogeneous nature of private law as a subject matter leads to this conclusion. This 
"narrow exclusive power - wide ancillary power" relationship also exists for interest[157] 
and bankruptcy. As Professors Brun and Tremblay have noted:[158] 
[Translation] In both cases [interest (91(19) and bankruptcy and insolvency (91(21))], 
federal exclusivity has a "very limited scope", but the courts have found that the federal 
government has a "very wide ancillary jurisdiction". This approach is certainly the most 
consistent with a contextual interpretation of the division of powers: in private law, 
federal powers are exceptions to the rule of subsection 92(13), and care must be taken to 
prevent that rule from becoming the exception through the combined effect of broad, 
exclusive federal powers. 
Thus, even assuming, for instance, that prescription does not come within the law of 
negotiable instruments in a strict sense or, in other words, the minimum exclusive content 
of federal jurisdiction over bills of exchange and notes,[159] it is my opinion that 
Parliament could most certainly use its ancillary power to enact a prescription period for 
negotiable instruments. There is no reason why such legislative action would not be 
valid, despite its impact on provincial legislative powers. There is no doubt that the 
federal government can restrict a right of action that it has itself created. The restriction 
could be in the form of a ban on appealing a court decision [160] or even an actual 
prescription period.[161] In Wewayakum Indian Band v. Canada,[162] Teitelbaum J. said 
the following: "Parliament can in the exercise of its powers under section 91 enact 
limitations which apply to matters, which for constitutional purposes, fall within the 
exclusive legislative competence of Parliament." 
Does the federal Parliament also have jurisdiction, for example, to enact rules of evidence 
with respect to negotiable instruments? Those rules can be divided into two types: 
(1) substantive rules, that is, [Translation] "all the rules on demonstrating the existence of 
a fact before a court"; and (2) [Translation] "procedural rules of evidence, [which] 
govern the use of various methods of proof in court proceedings".[163] In provincial 
courts in Quebec, the latter rules are found in the articles of the Civil Code of Procedure. 
The procedural rules that apply in federal courts have been enacted by the federal 
Parliament.[164] 
There is no question that Parliament has the power to enact substantive rules of evidence 
in fields within its jurisdiction.[165] If such a power did not flow from its exclusive 
jurisdiction, it would certainly be part of its ancillary jurisdiction. Parliament exercised 
that power in relation to negotiable instruments when it enacted section 57 of the Bills of 
Exchange Act. It has also enacted the Canada Evidence Act,[166] which is most certainly 
valid in its application to federal civil matters, such as bills of exchange. In fact, it has 
been held that the provisions of that Act take precedence over provincial rules of 
evidence in litigation concerning negotiable instruments.[167] Finally, section 40 of the 
Canada Evidence Act provides that provincial rules of evidence apply on a suppletive 
basis in proceedings under federal jurisdiction. However, that application is possible only 
if [Translation] "the application of provincial law is not excluded by a specific provision 
of a federal statute".[168] 
In reality, in so far as Parliament's purpose is to regulate negotiable instruments and not 
to indirectly regulate contracts in general, its ancillary power most likely authorizes it to 
legislate in relation to the following subjects: the capacity to make an instrument, the 
scope of the liability of those who have signed or endorsed a note or bill of exchange, the 
establishment of prescription periods, the cause or consideration that makes a note or bill 
lawful and, finally, as we have seen, evidence. 
The importance of Parliament's ancillary power in relation to bills of exchange and 
promissory notes will be taken into account when I make my recommendations. 
I will now examine Parliament's jurisdiction over interest. 
(ii) Federal jurisdiction over interest 
(a)Scope of the exclusive power 
Subsection 91(19) grants Parliament exclusive jurisdiction in relation to "interest". This 
private law power, like the one I have just examined, is an exception to subsection 92(13) 
of the Constitution. If it had not been assigned to Parliament, it would most certainly fall 
under subsection 92(13).[169] Thus, everything that was said above about the 
relationship between federal private law and provincial civil law is also applicable here. 
In this section, it will be seen that federal jurisdiction over interest has been interpreted 
by the courts in the same way as federal jurisdiction over negotiable instruments. The 
courts have kept the scope of Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction to a strict minimum, 
while acknowledging that it may have a "very wide ancillary jurisdiction".[170] As a 
result of this approach by the courts, the provinces have a great deal of leeway as far as 
interest is concerned. For the purposes of this report, it is not necessary to discuss all the 
decisions rendered on the scope of subsection 91(19) of the Constitution. However, a few 
are deserving of attention. 
**** 
Given the exceptional nature of federal jurisdiction over interest, the question arises: 
what are the legislative purposes that only Parliament can pursue in exercising that 
jurisdiction? What is the specifically federal content of the jurisdiction? To answer this 
question, the reasons why the jurisdiction was assigned to Parliament must be 
determined. 
Generally speaking, the heads of power set out in section 91 of the Constitution were 
assigned to Parliament because of a concern for uniformity, for guaranteeing the 
protection of the country's general interests.[171] The need for uniformity resulting from 
the negotiability of commercial paper explains why Parliament was granted exclusive 
jurisdiction over such instruments.[172] What explains its jurisdiction over interest? 
The fact that Parliament was given jurisdiction over interest under subsection 91(19) can 
be explained by the desire of the legislators of the time to ensure that a uniform 
commercial and economic policy was put in place across Canada.[173] This can be seen 
from the fact that Parliament was also given jurisdiction over banking (91(15)), currency 
and coinage (91(14)), weights and measures (91(17)), taxation (91(3)) and commerce 
(91(2)). One of the objectives of that policy was most certainly to ensure the free 
movement of capital by avoiding a situation in which interest rates varied from one 
province to another, which is why Parliament was given exclusive jurisdiction over this 
matter.[174] The objective sought by the legislators was the centralization of credit 
policy,[175] and to date, most of the federal enactments in this area have concerned 
contracts for the lending of money.[176] A provincial statute dealing with interest, even 
one that relates explicitly to interest, will therefore not be found unconstitutional unless it 
can be said that it is "primarily concerned with financial matters".[177] Accordingly, to 
properly understand the scope given by the courts to federal jurisdiction over interest, it is 
essential to bear in mind its economic and financial purpose. 
In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Barfried Enterprises Ltd.,[178] the respondent argued 
that a provincial statute, The Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act,[179] was 
unconstitutional because it was in relation to interest. The Act authorized a judge to 
modify the terms of a loan of money if the judge found that the "cost of the loan" was 
excessive. The Act defined the expression "cost of the loan" as the whole cost to the 
debtor of money lent, including discount, subscription, premium, dues, bonus, etc., as 
well as interest. In short, the Act applied only to contracts for interest-bearing loans and, 
what is more, related directly to interest. 
The Court of Appeal found the Act invalid on the ground that it authorized a judge to 
modify a loan contract by reducing the interest payable.[180] According to the Court, the 
word "interest" was to be understood in its broadest sense as meaning the whole cost of a 
loan.[181] The Supreme Court of Canada rejected that approach and found the Act to be 
valid. 
Judson J.[182] first stated that exclusive federal jurisdiction under subsection 91(19) of 
the Constitution concerns interest as a sum of money that accrues from day to day.[183] 
Therefore, not all compensation for loss of the use of money can be considered interest. 
Judson J. then noted that the Act dealt with rights arising from contract; as such, it was 
prima facie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces under subsection 92(13) of 
the Constitution. Finally, he concluded that the dominant characteristic of the Act was not 
the regulation of interest to be paid but the reformation of unconscionable contracts. He 
wrote the following in this regard:[184] 
The wording of the statute indicates that it is not the rate or amount of interest which is 
the concern of the legislation but whether the transaction as a whole is one which it 
would be proper to maintain as having been freely consented to by the debtor . . . The fact 
that interference with such a contract may involve interference with interest as one of the 
constituent elements of the contract is incidental. The legislature considered this type of 
contract as one calling for its interference because of the vulnerability of the contract as 
having been imposed on one party by extreme economic necessity. 
Cartwright J.'s opinion of the impugned Act was that "[i]ts primary purpose and effect are 
to enlarge the equitable jurisdiction to give relief against harsh and unconscionable 
bargains which the courts have long exercised; it affects, but only incidentally, the 
subject-matter of Interest specified in head 19 of s. 91".[185] It might be added that even 
though the Act touched on a credit-related matter, it sought to achieve a fundamental 
social purpose, namely the protection of vulnerable borrowers. 
A few years later, the Supreme Court of Canada once again stressed the very limited 
scope of exclusive federal power over interest. In Tomell Investments Limited v. East 
Marstock Lands Limited,[186]Pigeon J.[187] stated that Parliament's exclusive power 
"does not extend to interest on all kinds of debts or claims, but only on contractual 
obligations."[188] According to Pigeon J., the result of this very restrictive interpretation 
was as follows:[189] 
Although in principle the abstention by the federal Parliament to exercise its exclusive 
legislative power does not enable the provincial legislatures to enact legislation on the 
subject, this is true only of what may be called the federal primary power. With respect to 
matters which are not strictly within such primary power but can be dealt with ancillarily, 
provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights and over matters of a local nature 
remains unimpaired until such time as the field is occupied. 
Exclusive federal jurisdiction over interest has thus been interpreted very restrictively. 
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Barfried and Tomell was also consistent 
with earlier decisions in relation to interest. The only provincial statutes that have been 
found invalid on the ground that they encroached on exclusive federal jurisdiction under 
subsection 91(19) of the Constitution are all statutes whose purpose was to regulate the 
interest to be paid on certain categories of debts[190] or on government bonds [191] by 
reducing or limiting the rate. Nonetheless, it should not be concluded from those 
decisions that a province can never set or reduce a rate of interest. As long as the main 
purpose of a provincial statute is not to regulate a rate of interest but rather to legislate in 
relation to a provincial matter, it has been found that the province can incidentally modify 
that rate. 
In Ladore v. Bennett,[192] two municipalities were amalgamated and their respective 
debts consolidated pursuant to a provincial statute. The debentures issued by the new 
municipality carried a lower rate of interest than the debentures they replaced. According 
to the Privy Council, this reduction in the interest rate was constitutional because it was 
incidental to the exercise of a valid provincial power in relation to municipal 
institutions.[193] In reality, the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over interest is so 
limited in scope that one author has concluded that there is concurrent federal and 
provincial jurisdiction in this area[194]. 
It will now be seen that to this restrictive interpretation of the specifically federal content 
of jurisdiction over interest, there is a corresponding generous interpretation of 
Parliament's ancillary power in this area. 
(b)Scope of the ancillary power 
As with negotiable instruments, the courts have found that the federal ancillary power in 
relation to interest is very wide. However, the exercise of that power must be consistent 
with its primary purpose, namely the establishment of a centralized credit policy. 
In Tomell, the appellant challenged the constitutional validity of subsection 8(1) of the 
Interest Act,[195] which prohibited the recovery, on any arrears of interest secured by a 
mortgage of real estate, of any fine, penalty or rate of interest that had the effect of 
increasing the charge on such arrears beyond the rate of interest payable on principal 
money not in arrears. The appellant had attempted to recover a bonus of three months' 
interest stipulated to be payable on default in a mortgage deed. Subsection 8(1) presented 
a problem because it covered charges, such as bonuses, that did not constitute interest 
within the meaning given to that term in Barfried. In other words, they were not charges 
that accrued day by day. The subsection therefore could not come within the exclusive 
power granted to Parliament by subsection 91(19) of the Constitution. 
A majority of the Court in Tomell relied on the ancillary power concept to validate 
subsection 8(1) of the Interest Act. As Pigeon J. noted, any legislation fixing a maximum 
rate of interest would be futile if Parliament could not, "expressly or impliedly, prohibit 
any stipulation that would have the effect of increasing the charge beyond the rate of 
interest allowed".[196] Thus, although the Act did not deal with interest in the strict sense 
of a charge accruing day by day, it was still valid.[197] Finally, Pigeon J. noted that the 
"narrow exclusive power/wide ancillary power" combination does not exist only for 
Parliament's jurisdiction over interest; it also exists in relation to bankruptcy and 
insolvency.[198] It must be admitted that the objective of the federal Act in question was 
completely in accordance with the purpose of subsection 91(19), namely the regulation of 
credit. 
The conclusion that should be drawn from this is that the only thing the provinces cannot 
do is fix or limit the rates of interest payable under a contract.[199] In fact, as Hogg has 
noted, unless the provincial legislation amounts to an abuse of power - colourable 
legislation - there is a good chance that it will be found valid.[200] 
*** 
The power of the two levels of government to legislate in respect of interest and 
negotiable instruments having been delineated, it is time to move on to an examination of 
the pre-Confederation provisions of the C.C.L.C. that deal with these matters. 
B. Examination of the pre-Confederation provisions of the C.C.L.C. relating to 
negotiable instruments and interest 
I will now specifically examine the provisions of the C.C.L.C. that refer to bills of 
exchange, promissory notes, cheques and interest. Once those provisions are identified, I 
will examine them in connection with the federal and provincial powers defined and 
analysed above. I will then determine whether any of the provisions fall within exclusive 
provincial or federal jurisdiction and whether there are some that neither level of 
government can deal with. Based on my conclusions, I will make the recommendations 
that I consider necessary. 
1. Articles relating to negotiable instruments 
(i) Identification of the articles that may still cause problems 
The task of identifying the provisions on bills of exchange, notes and cheques that were 
part of the C.C.L.C. prior to 1867 has been greatly simplified by the work of P.-A. 
Crépeau and J.E.C. Brierley entitled Code civil - Civil Code, 1866-1980: Historical and 
Critical Edition.[201] From a careful reading of their work, I was able to conclude that 
the following pre-Confederation provisions refer to bills of exchange, notes and cheques: 
1077, third paragraph, 1229, 1573, 1750, 2190, 2260(4) and 2279 to 2354.[202] 
As will now be seen, a number of those provisions were repealed by Parliament prior to 
the replacement of the C.C.L.C. in 1991. 
(a) C.C.L.C. articles repealed by Parliament prior to 1991 
In 1886, Parliament decided to revise its own statutes and also certain pre-Confederation 
statutes that were still in force and, since 1867, "relate[d] to matters within the legislative 
authority of the Parliament of Canada".[203] However, because it doubted whether it had 
jurisdiction to deal with some of those statutes, Parliament drew up a list of the pre-
Confederation provisions "in respect to which the power of legislation is doubtful or has 
been doubted, and which have in consequence not been consolidated".[204] Those 
provisions included the following articles: 1573, 2280, 2287, 2306a, 2334, 2336, 2340, 
2341, 2342, 2343a, 2346, 2348 and 2354.[205] All of them deal with bills of exchange, 
notes and cheques. 
A few years later, in 1890, Parliament enacted its first major statute on bills of exchange, 
notes and cheques, the Bills of Exchange Act.[206] Section 95 provided that the 
enactments listed in the second schedule to the Act were repealed as from the 
commencement of the Act. The second schedule read in part as follows: "Articles 2,279 
to 2,354, both inclusive, [e]xcept in so far as such articles, or any of them, relate to 
evidence in regard to bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes". Subject to the 
problem presented by modification of the form of the C.C.L.C. articles, section 95 had 
the effect of expressly repealing the provisions mentioned in the schedule. However, 
there has been disagreement on the scope of the exception set out in the schedule. Which 
articles relate to evidence? Authors are at least agreed that the only problematic articles 
are 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354; the others have been permanently repealed. 
As far as article 2340 is concerned, I agree with Perrault that it was repealed in 1890. It 
does not relate to evidence, whereas article 2341 does specifically deal with evidence. It 
can be deduced that the purpose of article 2340 was not also to regulate evidence.[207] 
What of articles 2341 and 2342?[208] The latter refers to articles 1246 to 1256 C.C.L.C., 
dealing with the examination of parties under oath. Those articles were repealed in 1897 
when the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted. According to Perrault, if it cannot be said 
that article 2342 was [Translation] "indirectly repealed", it must at least be admitted that 
it has no purpose.[209] It is my opinion, in keeping with the one I stated above,[210] that 
since article 2342 was not repealed expressly, it was still in force in 1991. It may well be 
that it has been inoperative since 1897, but this does not mean that its normative 
existence was permanently abolished. 
The same conclusion applies to article 2341. Much has been written[211] about whether 
that provision was repealed either by the passage of the Canada Evidence Act[212] or by 
section 4 of the statute[213] that implemented the Revised Statutes of Canada of 1906. 
Those who argue that it was repealed have had to acknowledge that the repeal was at 
most implied.[214] There is no need to review the arguments of those authors in detail. 
Like article 2342, article 2341 may now be inoperative, but it has not been expressly 
repealed.[215] 
Having completed this analysis, I would like to again point out the provisions that 
remained problematic prior to the replacement of the C.C.L.C. They are articles 1077, 
1229, 1573, 1750, 2190, 2260(4), 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354. The question that now 
arises is whether the province of Quebec could unilaterally repeal those articles. To 
answer this question, it must be determined whether the matter to which they relate falls 
under the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense. If so, the province did not have 
the power to repeal them. In other words, it must be determined whether they relate to the 
conditions for the formation and negotiability of negotiable instruments, to the rights and 
obligations of the parties to such contracts, to the types of holders or to the privileges 
granted to them. If that is not the case, the provincial repeal will be valid, since, as noted 
above,[216] when pursuing a purpose that falls within its jurisdiction, a province can 
specifically deal with bills of exchange, notes and cheques. 
(b)C.C.L.C. articles repealed by the Quebec legislature in 1991 
Just before the C.C.L.C. was replaced, the following articles were still in force: 1077, 
1229, 1573, 1750, 2190, 2260(4), 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354. In my opinion, all those 
articles, except article 1750, could be repealed by Parliament in the exercise of its 
ancillary jurisdiction over bills of exchange, notes and cheques. However, to properly 
answer this question, I must consider whether the repeal by the Quebec legislature was 
also valid. If so, federal action may not be desirable. My recommendations will flow 
from the conclusions reached. 
Article 1077: Article 1077 deals with moratory damages, that is, damages to compensate 
for harm suffered by a creditor because of the late performance of an obligation. The 
third paragraph of article 1077 states that A[t]his article does not affect the special rules 
applicable to bills of exchange and contracts of suretyship". Originally, that paragraph 
related to article 2336, which set the rate of damages payable when a person failed to 
honour a bill of exchange. That article was repealed in 1890 and replaced by section 57 
of the Bills of Exchange Act.[217] Paragraph 3 of article 1077 does not in any way 
concern the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense. Its main focus is not 
negotiable instruments, but moratory damages. It simply recognizes that the C.C.L.C. 
provisions applicable to such damages do not preclude the application of provisions that 
deal specifically with the question of damages resulting from the failure to pay a bill of 
exchange. In short, the purpose of this provision is to acknowledge the primacy of the 
rules specifically applicable to bills of exchange. The province clearly had the power to 
repeal it. 
I also feel that, as a provision falling within the law of negotiable instruments in a wide 
sense, this provision could be repealed by Parliament. 
Article 1573: Very little has been written about this provision.[218] Its purpose is 
basically to specify that the formalities established by articles 1571 and 1572 of the 
C.C.L.C. for the sale of a whole class of debts do not apply to negotiable 
instruments.[219] Its purpose is similar to that of article 1077 in fine. Like that article, 
article 1573 simply provides that the rules specifically applicable to negotiable 
instruments must be followed. There is therefore no encroachment on the law of 
negotiable instruments in a strict sense. The province could repeal this provision. This 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that article 1573 was referred to in Schedule B of the 
1886 Revised Statutes of Canada.[220] Thus, even Parliament doubted whether it had the 
power to amend it. 
It should be added that while the Bills of Exchange Act regulates certain negotiable 
instruments (bills of exchange, notes, cheques and consumer notes and bills), there are 
many documents that, without meeting the definition criteria of those instruments, do 
have some of the same characteristics.[221] It is not very clear which level of 
government has the power to regulate those documents. For example, the courts have 
applied rules analogous to those set out in the Bills of Exchange Act to debentures, bearer 
bonds and deposit certificates even though the Act does not say anything about 
them.[222] On the other hand, no one questions the power of the provinces to legislate in 
relation to bills of lading, even though they may be negotiated by endorsement and 
delivery.[223] It may therefore be thought that the Quebec legislature had jurisdiction 
with respect to debentures, the transfer of shares in the capital stock of provincial 
companies and, possibly, notes for the payment of money or the delivery of grain or other 
things. 
However, although I am of the opinion that, given its purpose, article 1573 does not fall 
under the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense, it seems clear to me that 
Parliament could repeal it by exercising its ancillary power. It should be noted that its 
power over banking and incorporation would also make its intervention valid. Article 
1573 refers to "bank checks"[224] and the transfer of shares in the capital stock of 
companies. Companies that pursue federal purposes are within Parliament's 
jurisdiction.[225] 
Article 1750: Only the Quebec legislature could repeal article 1750, because its purpose 
is simply to define what constitutes an advance. It obviously does not seek to regulate the 
law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense. The province of Quebec could repeal this 
article without any difficulty. Furthermore, the connection of the article to the law of 
negotiable instruments is so tenuous that I doubt that Parliament could have any 
jurisdiction over it. 
Articles 2260(4) and 2190: To determine whether the Quebec legislature could repeal 
articles 2260(4) and 2190, which relate to prescription in connection with bills of 
exchange, two questions must be examined. First of all, is prescription a matter that falls 
within the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense? If not, can it be regulated by a 
provincial statute of specific application? If it is acknowledged that the Quebec 
legislature has the power to enact a specific prescription period for negotiable 
instruments, it must be concluded that it was authorized to repeal the prescription period 
in article 2260(4). That provision establishes a prescription period of five years for bills 
of exchange, notes and all claims of a commercial nature. It therefore does not deal 
exclusively with negotiable instruments. 
Article 2190 covers situations in which prescription is entirely acquired in Lower Canada 
or entirely under a foreign law. It does not deal solely with bills of exchange. 
The Bills of Exchange Act has never provided for prescription periods. Provincial 
prescription periods [226] therefore apply [227] to litigation involving negotiable 
instruments.[228] This has always been the case, even prior to 1890, when the Bills of 
Exchange Act was enacted.[229] 
A number of authors[230] have argued that this application of provincial statutes that 
establish prescription periods in the federal sphere is unconstitutional, because the 
statutes deal with a matter that falls within exclusive federal jurisdiction under subsection 
91(18) of the Constitution. According to them, the application of such statutes is merely 
tolerated.[231] That tolerance is all the more justified given that section 9 of the Bills of 
Exchange Act is of no use when it comes to prescription, since the concept of 
"limitation", the equivalent of our concept of prescription, is a purely statutory 
creation.[232] 
In an article entitled "L'interaction entre le droit privé fédéral et le droit civil québécois en 
matière d'effets de commerce: perspective constitutionnelle",[233] I gave detailed 
consideration to whether provincial prescription periods apply to negotiable instruments. 
My conclusions were as follows: (1) prescription is not a matter that falls under the law 
of negotiable instruments in a strict sense; and (2) it is not unconstitutional for a 
provincial legislature to establish a specific prescription period for negotiable 
instruments. 
As regards the first point, I felt that it could be said that a prescription period does not 
completely destroy a holder's right of action, as was the case with the provision in issue 
in Atlas Lumber. The provincial statute that was considered in that case had the effect of 
denying all access to the courts. The holder of a negotiable instrument could in no way 
exercise the rights given to holders by federal legislation. Without a permit, no action 
could be brought. The impugned statute [Translation] "hindered the use of negotiable 
instruments or made it impossible."[234] A prescription period does not have that effect. 
It simply seeks, on public interest grounds, to protect debtors from negligent creditors 
who fail to bring proceedings within a given time period. It does not completely destroy 
the holder's right of action. Access to the courts remains possible. A prescription period 
simply requires the creditor of the maker of a note to act promptly, and it in no way 
endangers the negotiability of a negotiable instrument. [235] Furthermore, there is no 
operational conflict, because the application of such a provincial provision does not seem 
to me to be incompatible with the purpose of federal legislation on negotiable 
instruments. That legislation gives the holder of a negotiable instrument a right to sue; 
however, there is no basis for concluding that this right is granted ad vitam eternam. It 
should be noted that in Costley v. Allen,[236] although the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen's Bench held that the Debt Adjustment Act [237] was inapplicable to an action 
based on a note, it nonetheless found that the Saskatchewan Statute of Limitations 
applied. 
Louis-Joseph de la Durantaye shares my opinion. According to him, it is necessary to 
distinguish between methods of extinction that extinguish both the instrument and the 
rights of action associated with it and methods that extinguish the obligation underlying 
the instrument but leave the instrument intact.[238] The former methods are related to 
negotiability and are therefore within federal jurisdiction.[239] They include payment, 
release, confusion, alteration and nullity.[240] The other methods of extinction, such as 
prescription, novation and compensation, are within provincial jurisdiction. As he notes, 
these methods of extinction concern [Translation] "the relationship of the parties outside 
the instrument".[241] With respect to these methods, [Translation] "Parliament, which 
could have legislated in relation to them under the 1867 Act, has left the field 
unoccupied. Moreover, these methods do not change either the elements or the effects of 
negotiability and therefore have nothing to do with the application of section 10 [now 
section 9]."[242] According to de la Durantaye, prescription does not fall within the law 
of negotiable instruments in a strict sense because its [Translation] "purpose relates not 
so much to the instrument as to the obligation behind it".[243] 
Finally, as regards the second point, I was of the opinion that in so far as provincial 
private law legislation does not encroach on the specifically federal nature of a private 
law power assigned to Parliament, it is not relevant whether that legislation is of general 
or specific application. Thus, in my view, a provincial statute could establish a specific 
prescription period for bills of exchange and notes. 
Canadian courts have found a number of provincial statutes valid even though they have 
dealt specifically with persons or undertakings under Ottawa's jurisdiction.[244] A direct 
reference to a note or bill of exchange does not make a provincial enactment 
unconstitutional, as shown above;[245] this is evident from the decisions of the 
Quebec[246] and Ontario[247] Courts of Appeal. Since a provincial prescription period 
does not encroach on the specifically federal nature of Parliament's jurisdiction, and since 
the establishment of such a period therefore falls within provincial jurisdiction under 
subsection 92(13) of the Constitution, why deny the provinces the power to do 
specifically what they can do by enacting a general prescription period? Specific 
prescription periods have also been found valid by the courts.[248] The close 
interrelationship of the components of private law, the exceptional nature of federal 
jurisdiction in this area and the scope of the power granted to the provinces by subsection 
92(13) all make the approach suggested here plausible. The province of Quebec, for 
example, would thus be entitled to enact a specific prescription period in relation to 
negotiable instruments. Its power to regulate the methods of extinguishing contractual 
obligations would justify such an enactment. If the province was suspected of using this 
power for inappropriate purposes, the concept of colourable legislation could be invoked. 
In any event, Parliament could, if it wished, enact a prescription period that excluded the 
application of the provincial period.[249] 
Other authors[250] have attempted to argue that provincial prescription periods are 
applicable in federal matters on the basis that prescription is procedural and not 
substantive in nature. According to them, prescription is a matter of procedure, and the 
provinces have the power to legislate specifically with respect to provincial procedure 
and federal procedure, other than criminal procedure.[251] This provincial jurisdiction 
over non-criminal procedure, they say, is based on jurisdiction over "[t]he Administration 
of Justice in the Province", granted to the provinces under subsection 92(14) of the 
Constitution.[252] The drawback of this approach[253] is that it assumes that prescription 
is a matter of procedure and not of substantive law. Yet nothing is less certain. That is 
why my interpretation seems preferable, as it is not based in any way on the 
"procedure/substantive law" distinction. I believe the provinces can establish prescription 
periods for negotiable instruments in the exercise of their jurisdiction under subsection 
92(13) of the Constitution. The Quebec legislature was therefore able to repeal the 
prescription period established by article 2260(4); it could also repeal the norm set out in 
article 2190 in so far as it related to bills of exchange. In doing so, it was pursuing a valid 
provincial purpose - the regulation of methods of extinguishing contractual obligations - 
without encroaching on the specifically federal nature of Parliament's jurisdiction over 
negotiable instruments.[254] 
I am aware that I am in the minority in stating that prescription in relation to bills of 
exchange and notes is not part of the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense. 
Moreover, in Cusson v. Robidoux,[255] the Supreme Court stated that the principles of 
common law are to be applied when classifying legislation for testing its 
constitutionality.[256] The Supreme Court recently stated that statutes relating to 
prescription are not procedural because they "destroy substantive rights";[257] rather, 
they establish substantive rules. In light of this conclusion, can it still be said that 
prescription is not part of the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense, in other 
words, of the specifically federal content of the power granted to Parliament by 
subsection 91(18) of the Constitution? I believe that it can. I think that it is dangerous to 
apply private international law distinctions in the context of the distribution of powers. 
Tolofson did not involve a distribution of powers issue, but rather a private international 
law issue. In such a context, the Court therefore did not have to concern itself with the 
specific relationship between the fundamental provincial jurisdiction in the area of 
private law and the exceptional federal powers in that area. Furthermore, the issue in such 
cases is not identifying the legislative authority that can enact legislation, but determining 
which validly enacted legislation should be applied in a given context. Finally, in the 
constitutional context, considerations of certainty and order favour the courts' usual 
practice of applying prescription periods established by provincial law. 
Nonetheless, my recommendations will take into account the uncertainty that surrounds 
the specific legal nature of prescription. Finally, as shown above, Parliament's ancillary 
power would certainly authorize it to regulate prescription in relation to negotiable 
instruments and therefore to repeal the normative content of articles 2260(4) and 
2190,[258] in so far as those articles relate to bills of exchange, notes and cheques. 
Articles 1229, 2341 and 2342: All these articles deal with evidence. The first, unlike the 
others, does not relate exclusively to negotiable instruments. Could these provisions be 
repealed by the province of Quebec? In other words, do substantive rules of evidence fall 
within the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense? I admit that there is no easy, 
clear answer to this question. 
Since 1893, federal evidence legislation has included a provision [259] making provincial 
rules of evidence applicable to federal matters on a suppletive basis. It would be wrong to 
believe that this legislation has settled all the constitutional problems that might arise. 
Once again, rules of substantive law must be distinguished from mere rules of 
evidence.[260] Despite this difficulty, a very broad provincial power to legislate with 
respect to evidence in federal civil matters has been recognized. This can be explained, 
inter alia, by the fundamental provincial jurisdiction in the area of private law and by 
provincial jurisdiction over civil procedure. Chevrette and Marx have stated that:[261] 
[Translation] [s]ubject to these classification problems [substantive law/law of evidence], 
a provincial statute concerning procedure or evidence, to be applicable to federal matters 
on a suppletive basis, does not have to be a general statute and may deal specifically with 
some of those matters . . . Its general nature may even make it so inappropriate to a given 
federal field that it will become inapplicable to that field. Conversely, its specific nature 
may be an indication that it is colourable legislation. 
This approach would lead to the conclusion that the repeal of articles 1229, 2341 and 
2342 by the province of Quebec was valid.[262] If a province has jurisdiction to enact 
evidence provisions of specific application in relation to negotiable instruments, it also 
has jurisdiction to repeal them. It could therefore be said that rules of evidence are not 
part of the law of negotiable instruments in a strict sense, in so far as they do not affect 
either negotiability or the rights and obligations of the parties to a negotiable instrument. 
On the other hand, there are others who think that only Parliament can regulate the law of 
evidence in relation to bills of exchange, notes and cheques.[263] Ducharme, for 
example, has written that the province of Quebec was not competent to repeal articles 
2340 and 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354 C.C.L.C.[264] It must be acknowledged that the 
question of which rules of evidence are applicable may affect the content of the rights 
and obligations of the parties in respect of a negotiable instrument. This can be seen from 
MacDonald v. Whitfield.[265] 
In that case, the directors of a company had all endorsed a note as security for a loan from 
the Merchants Bank of Canada. The signatures of the parties to the case followed one 
another on the back of the instrument, with MacDonald appearing as the first endorser. In 
an action brought by the bank, the appellant offered no defence. As for the respondent, he 
brought an action in warranty against MacDonald under article 1953 C.C.L.C. His 
purpose in so doing was to be reimbursed for any compensation he might be required to 
pay to the bank. 
After conceding that a first endorser was under a duty, originating in the law-merchant, to 
indemnify subsequent endorsers,[266] Lord Watson declared that another well-
established rule of law was no less applicable: that all the circumstances attendant upon 
the signing of a negotiable instrument could be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining 
the scope of the obligations to be borne by each endorser.[267] In the case before him, 
Lord Watson said, the signing of the note by the parties to the case did not in itself 
constitute a true endorsement contract; in signing it, the endorsers did nothing more than 
perform what they had undertaken to do in an earlier agreement: 
In a case like the present, the signing of their names on the note, by way of indorsement, 
in order to induce the bank to discount it to the promissor, is not, as between the 
indorsers, pars contractus, but is merely the performance by them of an antecedent 
agreement. The terms of that previous contract must settle their liabilities inter se, 
irrespective altogether of the rules of the law-merchant, which will nevertheless be 
binding upon them in any question with parties to the note who were not likewise parties 
to the agreement.[268] 
Lord Watson then summarily dismissed the American and Canadian decisions [269] that 
favoured the approach advocated by Whitfield. He based his decision on article 2340 
C.C.L.C. Because article 2346 C.C.L.C. provided that article 2340 was applicable to 
notes, "in so far as regards the liability of the parties; and seeing that the Code makes no 
provision regarding the question raised between the appellant and the respondent, that 
question must . . . be decided according to the law of England,"[270] which in this case 
was a decision of the Court of Common Pleas.[271] As a natural consequence of this 
decision, it was held in Quebec that testimony may be used to prove the nature of the 
circumstances surrounding the signing of a negotiable instrument.[272] 
In short, the least that can be said is that there is no easy answer to the question as to 
whether or not evidence falls within the law of negotiable instruments in the strict 
sense.[273] Nevertheless, considering that the provinces have fundamental jurisdiction in 
matters relating to private law and evidence in civil matters, and that the federal evidence 
legislation attests to Parliament's intention that provincial law be applied in a 
complementary manner in these areas, I agree with Chevrette and Marx that evidence 
instead falls within the law of negotiable instruments in the wide sense. Thus, a 
provincial legislature could legislate in this area. In the event of conflict with a federal 
norm, the federal norm will prevail. The province of Quebec was therefore competent to 
repeal articles 1229, 2341 and 2342 C.C.L.C. My recommendations will take into 
account the uncertainty as to whether or not the law of evidence falls within the law of 
negotiable instruments in the strict sense. 
Finally, it should be noted that here again Parliament could use its ancillary power to 
repeal the provisions mentioned above.[274] 
(ii) Conclusions and recommendations 
As the philosopher Jean Guitton said, [Translation] "He who does not know what he is 
looking for does not know what he finds". In presenting my recommendations, I will 
therefore presume that the Parliament of Canada has undertaken this vast analysis of the 
C.C.L.C. in order to prevent litigation and clarify the law. I will also presume that 
Parliament intends, in compliance with the motion passed by the federal government on 
December 11, 1995, to intervene in a manner that respects the integrity of Quebec's "civil 
law tradition". It is in light of these concerns that I will now present my 
recommendations. 
(a) Introductory comments 
In the following recommendations, the reader will see that I propose that Parliament 
repeal the normative content of certain provisions of the C.C.L.C. On this subject, two 
comments must be made. 
First, if it is to be effective, the repeal must be express. It is not enough for Parliament to 
merely enact provisions in the Bills of Exchange Act - for example, a prescription period - 
that would be inconsistent with a pre-Confederation norm. In such a situation, for the 
reasons given in Part I.C, the pre-Confederation norm would not be eliminated but would 
merely be inapplicable. 
Second, it would be wise to draft the repealing provision in such a way that it clearly 
applies to the normative content of the article. There are two reasons for this approach. 
First, certain articles, such as articles 1129, 2190 and 2260(4), are not limited to 
negotiable instruments - they also deal with provincial matters. As a result, the norms 
referred to in these articles can be repealed by Parliament only in so far as they relate to 
bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques. Second, as explained above,[275] it is 
not clear that either level of government is competent to alter the actual form of the 
C.C.L.C. 
(b) Recommendations  
• Article 1750: This article presents no difficulties. In my opinion, it has been 
validly repealed by the Quebec legislature. I even consider it doubtful that 
Parliament could intervene in any way whatsoever in the matter to which it 
relates, i.e. advance payments.  
I recommend that the Parliament of Canada take no action with respect to article 1750. 
• Third paragraph of article 1077 and article 1573: For the reasons given above, it 
is my opinion that these provisions have been validly repealed by the Quebec 
legislature. Parliament could also repeal them under its ancillary power. However, 
I consider it politically expedient for Parliament to refrain from intervening where 
repeal by the province is unlikely to give rise to litigation. It would be advisable 
to take action only where truly necessary, which is not the case here. The sole 
purpose of these two provisions was to recognize the primacy of rules specifically 
applicable to negotiable instruments.  
• Articles 1229, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354[276] C.C.L.C.: Although it 
might be said that all these articles have been validly repealed by the Quebec 
legislature, not all authors share this point of view. I therefore consider it 
necessary for the Parliament of Canada to intervene, as it is authorized to do in 
virtue of its ancillary power, by expressly repealing the norms noted in the above 
articles in so far as they relate to bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques. 
It is time to end the controversy to which they give rise.  
It should be noted that, although article 2340 was in my opinion repealed by the Bills of 
Exchange Act of 1890, I have nevertheless added it to my list of norms to be eliminated. I 
consider it appropriate to do so in order to eliminate any possibility of disputes. A section 
worded as follows could be added to the Bills of Exchange Act: 
Proposal No. 1[277] 
(1)(a) The legal rules referred to in articles 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354 C.C.L.C. 
are repealed.  
(b) The legal rule referred to in article 1229 C.C.L.C. is repealed in so far as it relates to 
bills, notes or cheques.[278] 
or 
Proposal No. 2 
(1)(a) Articles 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354 C.C.L.C. are repealed. 
(b) Article 1229 C.C.L.C. is repealed in so far as it relates to bills, notes or cheques. 
To repeal the norms referred to in these provisions would result, in conformity with s. 40 
of the Canada Evidence Act, in the application of provincial rules of evidence to 
negotiable instruments on a suppletive basis. This was in fact what the Parliament of 
Canada intended when it enacted the Canada Evidence Act in 1893. That Act already 
contained an incorporating provision corresponding to the present s. 40. As Perrault 
wrote: [Translation] "[i]t must be presumed that Parliament intended, with section [40], 
to submit bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes to the rules of evidence in 
force in our province, not to those in force in England on May 30, 1849, and to give 
articles 1203 to 1245 C.C. precedence over articles 2341, 2346 and 2354 C.C."[279] He 
considered this reasoning "more logical"[280] than to argue that this provision referred 
indirectly to the law of England. 
Nevertheless, despite the express repeal of articles 1229, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 and 
2354, one problem remains, i.e. in light of s. 9 of the Bills of Exchange Act, s. 40 of the 
Canada Evidence Act may not be sufficiently explicit to guarantee the application of 
provincial rules of evidence to negotiable instruments. It will still be possible for a 
litigant to argue that evidence falls within the law of negotiable instruments in the strict 
sense and that s. 9 of the Bills of Exchange Act accordingly authorizes recourse to the 
rules of evidence of English law. This reasoning has already had some success in Quebec 
courts.[281] Thus, if the intention is in fact for provincial rules of evidence to apply on a 
suppletive basis where evidence is at issue, it will be necessary to introduce a provision 
similar to s. 40 of the Canada Evidence Act into the Bills of Exchange Act itself. It might 
read as follows: 
(1) In all proceedings involving a bill, a note or a cheque, the rules of evidence in force in 
the province in which those proceedings are instituted apply to those proceedings in so 
far as they are not excluded by a specific provision of this Act. 
• Articles 2190 and 2260(4): These two articles deal with prescription in relation to 
bills of exchange; they also deal with matters which are within provincial 
jurisdiction. As was mentioned supra, even though the question has been the 
subject of much debate, the repeal of articles 2260(4) and 2190 by the Quebec 
legislature is most likely valid. Nevertheless, I recommend that Parliament 
intervene expressly to definitively repeal this prescription period. In light of the 
uncertainty surrounding this question, some able litigant is certain to argue that 
the repeal of article 2260(4) by the province of Quebec was unconstitutional.[282] 
The following section could be added to the Bills of Exchange Act:  
Proposal No. 1 [283] 
(1) The legal rules referred to in articles 2190 and 2260(4) C.C.L.C. are repealed in so far 
as they relate to bills, notes or cheques.[284] 
or 
Proposal No. 2  
(1) Articles 2190 and 2260(4) C.C.L.C. are repealed in so far as they relate to bills, notes 
or cheques. 
This repeal by Parliament would lead in practice to the application of provincial 
prescription periods of general application where prescription is at issue. As has already 
been mentioned, the Bills of Exchange Act contains no prescription periods. It is true that 
the application of provincial prescription periods raises constitutional problems.[285] To 
overcome them, a section could be added to the Bills of Exchange Act to make provincial 
prescription periods applicable to litigation involving a bill of exchange, promissory note 
or cheque.[286] This provision could read as follows: 
(1) In all proceedings involving a bill, a note or a cheque, the laws relating to prescription 
and the limitation of actions as between subject and subject that are in force in the 
province in which those proceedings are taken apply to those proceedings. 
Parliament may consider it appropriate not only to repeal article 2260(4), but also to 
adopt a specific prescription period for bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques. 
If that is its intention, it will have to bear in mind that the concept of "limitation" 
recognized by the common law provinces is not perfectly identical to the civil law 
concept of "prescription". In light of Ottawa's badly bungled work on prescription in 
relation to intellectual property,[287] I do not recommend the adoption of a specific 
prescription period for bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques. It seems 
preferable to me to make provincial prescription periods applicable by reference. 
Furthermore, this would merely confirm the usual practice of the courts. 
2. Articles relating to interest 
As will be seen, the pre-Confederation articles of the C.C.L.C. relating to interest are 
much less problematic even though they are more numerous than those relating to 
negotiable instruments. 
(i) Identification of the articles that may still cause problems 
The study by P.-A. Crépeau and J.E.C. Brierley has enabled me to identify almost fifty 
pre-Confederation provisions that refer to interest.[288] Most of them are in no way 
related to the federal head of power set out in subsection 91(19) of the Constitution. 
Some of the provisions essentially indicate when interest becomes payable in the absence 
of an express stipulation. This is the case in relation to tutorship (articles 296 and 313), 
usufruct (article 722), the thing bequeathed (article 871), community of property (article 
1360, now repealed), the sale of litigious rights (article 1582), mandate (articles 1714 and 
1724), presumption of payment (article 1786), deposit (article 1807), partnership (article 
1840) and the hypothecary action (articles 2072 and 2074). 
Other articles indicate whether a sum of money must be paid with principal and interest. 
They involve a number of subject areas: redemption of rents (article 393), usufruct (arti-
cle 474), substitution (articles 947 and 965-966), quasi-contract resulting from the 
reception of a thing not due (article 1049), tender (article 1163), warranty against eviction 
(article 1511), sale price (articles 1534 and 1538) and forced sale (article 1586). Many of 
these provisions refer to the legal rate of interest. 
Finally, some articles specify whether or not interest is included in, for example, civil 
fruits (article 449) or an accessory to a debt that has been sold (article 1575). Article 465 
indicates to whom interest generated by certain things belongs (interest on sums of 
money comprised in a usufruct); articles 1111 and 1116 deal with joint and several 
obligations in relation to demands of interest; articles 1159, 1967 and 1974 concern the 
imputation of payments; and article 1787 concerns the constitution of rent. Articles 2017, 
2034 and 2061 relate to hypothecs that secure the payment of interest, while articles 
2122, 2124, 2125 and 2139 deal with interest and the registration of real rights. Finally, 
article 2250 establishes a prescription period for arrears of interest. 
None of the above provisions are in any way concerned with credit. They do not govern 
the interest rate payable under the terms of a given obligation. They set neither the 
interest rate nor the maximum interest rate payable under the terms of a given obligation. 
They are therefore not "primarily concerned with financial matters".[289] Nor do they 
directly or indirectly affect the free movement of capital. The dominant feature of them 
all is a matter incontestably within the provincial sphere. 
There are only three pre-Confederation provisions of the C.C.L.C. that may be 
problematic: articles 1077, 1078 and 1785.[290] Was it possible for the province to 
repeal these articles unilaterally? As will be seen below, although the repeal of article 
1077 did not, strictly speaking, cause any problems, the same was not true of the repeal 
of articles 1078 and 1785.  
• Article 1077: This provision deals with the awarding of moratory damages. The 
purpose of moratory damages is to compensate a creditor for the harm resulting 
from tardiness in the performance of an obligation. The obligation may be based 
on an agreement, a judgment or legislation.[291] Furthermore, if such an 
obligation [Translation] "was created by an agreement, it does not matter whether 
the agreement was a sale, loan, mandate or deposit".[292]  
The burden is ordinarily on creditors to prove that they sustained damage due to the delay 
in performance.[293] However, article 1077 establishes a rule that in the case of an 
obligation to pay money, moratory damages may be claimed in the absence of such proof. 
The harm is presumed.[294] As Professors Pineau and Burman have noted,[295] this 
provision is a codified expression of the popular saying: "Time is money". Nevertheless, 
damages will be available only if the debtor was put in default.[296] Finally, the interest 
rate payable will be that agreed upon by the parties or, in the absence of such an 
agreement, the rate fixed by law, in this case, the Interest Act.[297] 
In my opinion, there is no question that the repeal of article 1077 is constitutional. This 
provision concerns only interest as damages, not interest as an instrument of credit. It 
therefore concerns a matter clearly within the authority of the province. It is included in a 
section entitled, "Of the Damages Resulting from the Inexecution of Obligations". The 
sole purpose of article 1077 is to set the amount of damages available for tardiness in the 
performance of a monetary obligation. This is clearly within provincial powers. As 
Professor J.-L. Baudouin noted,[298] [Translation] "[i]t is . . . the provinces that have the 
exclusive power to provide for a legal means of compensating for the breach of a legal 
obligation. It is also the provinces that have the right to set the amount of this 
compensation where necessary. It is of little importance whether this amount is set, for 
moratory damages, by reference to a table in a federal statute, a provincial statute or a 
regulation, or even to any other rate (for example, a bank discount rate)". I agree. In my 
opinion, the repeal by the province of Quebec of the normative content of article 1077 
was entirely valid. Article 1077 sets the amount of damages payable; it in no way 
attempts to set an interest rate.  
• Article 1078: I consider that the province's repeal of article 1078 was valid.  
This article states that anatocism, or the capitalization of interest, will be authorized only 
if the parties to an agreement have so agreed or if it is sought by way of judicial 
application.[299] It follows that a default notice will not, in and of itself, result in 
anatocism.[300] 
It is true that this article [Translation] "prevents usury"[301] by limiting the situations 
that give rise to the capitalization of interest. It is clearly within Parliament's power under 
subsection 91(19) to determine what constitutes a usurious rate of interest.[302] Does this 
necessarily mean that article 1078 falls within Parliament's jurisdiction and that it alone 
has the power to repeal the normative content thereof? 
I concluded above that the only thing a province is not authorized to do is to fix or limit 
the interest rates payable under a contract. This therefore bars it from defining what 
constitutes a usurious interest rate. Does article 1078 do this? I think not. It deals with 
interest as damages and its dominant feature is not the regulation per se of the interest 
rate. The exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament is generally defined as a power to 
[Translation] "set a maximum rate"[303] or to "fix or limit rates of interest under all 
types of contract".[304] Thus, in Barfried, the impugned provincial legislation was found 
to be valid because, inter alia, it did not specifically concern "the rate or amount of 
interest"[305] payable under a contract. Moreover, it was noted above [306] that only 
those provincial laws that reduce or set a maximum limit for the interest rate payable on 
certain categories of debts have been held to be unconstitutional.[307] Article 1078 does 
not do this. It neither sets nor regulates interest rates; it does not even prohibit anatocism, 
but simply limits the cases in which anatocism is permitted. Its purpose is to protect 
debtors by obliging a creditor to state in the agreement itself that he or she intends to 
claim interest on interest. It is thus pursuing a social objective far more than a financial 
one. If it infringes the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over interest, the 
infringement seems to me to be quite minor. Thus, the repeal of the normative content of 
article 1078 by the province of Quebec was valid.  
• Article 1785: With the exception of paragraph 1, which in my opinion is clearly 
within provincial jurisdiction, article 1785 falls decidedly within Parliament's 
jurisdiction. The lending of money most definitely falls within provincial 
authority. For example, the provincial legislation held to be valid in Barfried dealt 
only with loans of money. In my opinion, the constitutional validity of the repeal 
of article 1786 is accordingly incontestable. This provision states that "[a]n 
acquittance for the principal debt creates a presumption of payment of the interest, 
unless there is a reserve of the latter". While concerning itself with interest-
bearing loans, however, the province must not pursue legislative ends that are 
within the exclusive power of the federal government under subsection 91(19) of 
the Constitution. Nonetheless, with the exception of its first paragraph, these are 
the ends pursued by article 1785. It is concerned with interest as an [Translation] 
"indemnity or . . . profit that the lender stipulates as the price for the enjoyment he 
grants the borrower."[308] It fixes the interest rate and sets a maximum rate in 
contractual matters, which is incontestably within the exclusive power of the 
Parliament of Canada. Article 1785 also deals with the interest rates that banks 
may impose, which is within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over such matters 
pursuant to subsection 91(15) of the Constitution.[309]  
(ii) Recommendations  
• Article 1077: Parliament should take no action with respect to this article. In my 
opinion, the article has no federal aspect significant enough to justify taking 
action.  
• Article 1078: It seems to me that this provision is within the jurisdiction of the 
Quebec legislature and that it would therefore be entirely lawful for the province 
to repeal it. Even assuming that article 1078 could have a federal aspect 
significant enough to justify federal intervention, I recommend that the Parliament 
of Canada do nothing about it. It should not be forgotten that the repeal of article 
1078 by Parliament could cast doubt on the constitutional validity of article 1620 
C.C.Q. In any event, since the provincial repeal appears to me to be perfectly 
valid, and since the validity of article 1078 has never been challenged in 124 
years, I recommend that Parliament take no action with respect thereto.  
• On article 1785: The Quebec legislature had absolute jurisdiction to repeal the 
norm set out in paragraph 1 of article 1785. However, it did not have the authority 
to repeal the normative content of the other paragraphs of this article. 
Furthermore, the repeal by Parliament of the problematic paragraphs would have 
no practical consequences since those paragraphs are inoperative today in light of 
the Interest Act.[310]  
I therefore recommend that a section worded as follows be added to the Interest Act: 
Proposal No. 1[311] 
(1) The legal rules referred to in paragraphs 2, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of article 1785 C.C.L.C. 
are repealed. 
or 
Proposal No. 2 
(1)(a) Paragraphs 2, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of article 1785 C.C.L.C. are repealed. 
C. Summary of recommendations:  
• Parliament should take no action with respect to articles 1077, 1078, 1573 and 
1750.  
• The norms set out in articles 1229, 1785, 2190, 2260(4), 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 
and 2354 should be expressly repealed in so far as they relate to bills of exchange, 
promissory notes and cheques. The simplest way to do this would be to add a 
short section to the Bills of Exchange Act, which might read as follows:  
Proposal No. 1[312] 
(1)(a) The legal rules referred to in articles 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354 C.C.L.C. 
are repealed.  
(b) The legal rules referred to in articles 1229, 2190 and 2260(4) C.C.L.C. are repealed in 
so far as they relate to bills, notes or cheques. 
or 
Proposal No. 2 
(1) (a) Articles 2340, 2341, 2342, 2346 and 2354 C.C.L.C. are repealed. 
(b) Articles 1229, 2190 and 2260(4) C.C.L.C. are repealed in so far as they relate to bills, 
notes or cheques. 
Once this first step is completed, the following measures could be adopted:  
• In order to clarify the law, a section to the effect that provincial prescription 
periods apply to every action involving a bill of exchange, promissory note or 
cheque could be added to the Bills of Exchange Act. This provision might read as 
follows:  
(1) In all proceedings involving a bill, a note or a cheque, the laws relating to prescription 
and the limitation of actions as between subject and subject that are in force in the 
province in which those proceedings are instituted apply to those proceedings. 
• Should the Parliament of Canada prefer to adopt a prescription period in the Bills 
of Exchange Act, it must be careful not to make the same mistakes as were made 
in relation to intellectual property. More specifically, it will have to consider the 
distinction between the concepts of "limitation" and "prescription".  
• A section should be added to the Bills of Exchange Act so as to guarantee that 
provincial rules of evidence apply to bills of exchange, promissory notes and 
cheques. In light of s. 9 of the Bills of Exchange Act, s. 40 of the Canada 
Evidence Act may not be explicit enough to guarantee the application of 
provincial rules of evidence to negotiable instruments. Such a section might read 
as follows:  
(1) In all proceedings concerning a bill, a note or a cheque, the laws of evidence in force 
in the province in which those proceedings are instituted apply to those proceedings in so 
far as they are not excluded by a specific provision of this Act. 
• Where article 1785 is concerned, the Quebec legislature had full jurisdiction to 
repeal the norm set out paragraph 1 thereof. However, it did not have the authority 
to repeal the normative content of the other paragraphs of this article. Finally, the 
repeal by the Parliament of Canada of the problematic paragraphs would have no 
practical consequence since those paragraphs are inoperative today in light of the 
Interest Act.  
I therefore recommend that a section reading as follows be added to the Interest Act: 
Proposal No. 1[313] 
(1) The legal rules referred to in paragraphs 2, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of article 1785 C.C.L.C. 
are repealed. 
or 
Proposal No. 2 
(1)(a) Paragraphs 2, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of article 1785 C.C.L.C. are repealed. 
APPENDIX I 
BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
Article 1077 
The damages resulting from delay in the 
payment of money, to which the debtor 
is liable, consist only on interest at the 
rate legally agreed upon by the parties, 
or, in the absence of such agreement, at 
the rate fixed by law.  
These damages are due without the 
creditor being obliged to prove any loss. 
They are due from the day of the default 
only, except in the cases where by law 
they are due from the nature of the 
obligation.  
This article does not affect the special 
rules applicable to bills of exchange and 
contracts of suretyship.  
Dans les obligations pour le paiement d'une 
somme d'argent, les dommages-intérêts 
résultant du retard ne consistent que dans 
l'intérêt au taux légalement convenu entre les 
parties, ou en l'absence de telle convention, 
au taux fixé par la loi.  
Ces dommages-intérêts sont dus sans que le 
créancier soit tenu de prouver aucune perte. 
Ils ne sont dus que du jour de la mise en 
demeure, excepté dans les cas où la loi les 
fait courir plutôt, à raison de la nature même 
de l'obligation.  
Le présent article n'affecte point les règles 
spéciales applicables aux lettres de change et 
aux cautionnements. 
Article 1229 
No indorsement or memorandum of any 
payment upon a promissory note, bill of 
Nul endossement ou mémoire d'un paiement 
écrit sur un billet promissoire, lettre de 
exchange or other writing, made by or on 
behalf of the party to whom such 
payment is made, is received in proof of 
such payment so as to take the debt out 
of the operation of the law respecting the 
limitation of actions. 
change ou autre écrit par celui à qui tel 
paiement a été fait, ou de sa part, n'est reçu 
comme preuve de tel paiement, de manière à 
soustraire la dette à l'effet de la loi relative à 
la prescription des actions. 
Article 1573 
The two last preceding articles do not 
apply to bills, notes or bank checks 
payable to order or to bearer, no 
signification of the transfer of them being 
necessary; nor to debentures for the 
payment of money, nor to transfers of 
shares in the capital stock of incorporated 
companies, which are regulated by the 
respective acts of incorporation or the by-
laws of such companies.  
Notes for the delivery of grain or other 
things, or for the payment of money, and 
payable to order or to bearer, may be 
transferred by endorsement or delivery, 
without notice, whether they are payable 
absolutely of subject to a condition.  
Les deux derniers articles qui précèdent ne 
s'appliquent pas aux lettres de change, 
billets, chèques ou mandats sur banquier, 
payables à ordre ou au porteur, dont la 
cession ne requiert pas de signification; non 
plus qu'aux débentures pour le paiement de 
sommes d'argent; ni au transport des actions 
dans les fonds de compagnies incorporées, 
qui est réglé par les actes d'incorporation ou 
les règlements respectifs de ces 
compagnies.  
Les billets pour deniers ou pour la livraison 
de grains ou autres choses, payables à ordre 
ou au porteur, peuvent être transportés par 
endossement ou délivrance, sans 
signification, soit qu'ils soient faits d'une 
manière absolue ou sous condition. 
Article 1750 
Every payment, whether made by money 
bill of exchange or other negotiable 
security, is deemed an advance within the 
provisions of this chapter.  
Tout paiement fait soit en argent, en lettres 
de change ou autres valeurs négociables, est 
censé une avance dans le sens de ce 
chapitre. 
Article 2190 
[As regards moveable property and 
personal actions, even in matters of bills 
of exchange and promissory notes and 
commercial matters in general, one or 
[En matière de biens-meubles et d'actions 
personnelles, même en matière de lettres de 
change et de billets promissoires, et en 
affaires de commerce en général, l'on peut 
more of the following prescriptions may 
be invokes:  
1. Any prescription entirely acquired 
under a foreign law, when the cause of 
action did not arise or the debt was not 
stipulated to be paid in Lower Canada, 
and such prescription has been so 
acquired before the possessor or the 
debtor had his domicile therein;  
2. Any prescription entirely acquired in 
Lower Canada, reckoning from the date 
of the maturity of the obligation, when 
the cause of action arose or the debt was 
stipulated to be paid therein, or the 
debtor had his domicile therein at the 
time of such maturity; and in other cases 
from the time when the debtor or 
possessor becomes domiciled therein;  
3. Any prescription, resulting from the 
lapse of successive periods in the cases 
of the two proceding paragraphs, when 
the first period clapsed under the foreign 
law.] 
invoquer séparément ou cumulativement;  
1. La prescription entièrement acquise sous 
une loi différente lorsque la cause d'action 
n'a pas pris naissance dans le Bas Canada, 
ou que la dette n'y a pas été stipulée 
payable, et lorsque cette prescription a été 
ainsi acquise avant que le possesseur ou le 
débiteur y ait eu son domicile;  
2. La prescription entièrement acquise dans 
le Bas Canada, à compter de l'échéance de 
l'obligation, lorsque la cause d'action y a 
pris naissance ou que la dette y a été 
stipulée payable, ou que le débiteur y avait 
son domicile à l'époque de cette échéance; 
et dans les autres cas à compter de 
l'acquisition de ce domicile par le débiteur 
ou le possesseur;  
3. La prescription résultant de temps 
successifs écoulés dans les cas des deux 
paragraphes précédents, lorsque le temps 
écoulé sous la loi différente a précédé.]  
Article 2260 
4. Upon inland or foreign bills of 
exchange, promissory notes, or notes for 
the delivery of grain or other things, 
whether negotiable or not, or upon any 
claim of a commercial nature, reckoning 
from maturity; this prescription however 
does not apply to bank notes; 
L'action se prescrit par cinq ans dans les cas 
suivants: [...]  
4. En fait de lettres de change à l'intérieur 
ou à l'étranger, billets promissoires ou 
billets pour livraison de grains ou autres 
choses négociables ou non, et en toutes 
matières commerciales, à compter de 
l'échéance; cette prescription, néanmoins, 
n'a pas lieu quant aux billets de banque; 
Article 2340 
In all matters relating to bills of 
exchange not provided for in this code 
recourse must be had to the laws of 
England in force on the thirtieth of May, 
one thousand eight hundred and forty-
nine. 
Dans toute matière relative aux lettres de 
change pour laquelle il ne se trouve pas de 
disposition dans ce code, on doit avoir 
recours aux lois d'Angleterre qui étaient en 
force le trente de mai mil huit cent 
quarante-neuf. 
Article 2341 
In the investigation of facts, in actions or 
suits founded on bills of exchange drawn 
or endorsed either by traders or other 
persons, recourse must be had to the laws 
of England in force at the time specified 
in the last preceding article, and no 
additional or different evidence is 
required or can be adduced by reason of 
any party to the bill not being a trader. 
Dans l'enquête des faits sur actions ou 
poursuites pour le recouvrement de lettres 
de change tirées ou endossées par des 
commerçants ou autres, on doit avoir 
recours aux lois d'Angleterre qui étaient en 
force à l'époque mentionnée dans l'article 
qui précède, sans que l'on doive ou puisse 
faire une preuve additionnelle ou différente 
à raison de ce que quelqu'une des parties 
sur la lettre de change n'est pas 
commerçante.  
Article 2342 
The parties in the actions or suits 
specified in the last preceding article may 
be examined under oath as provided in 
the title Of Obligations.  
Dans les actions ou poursuites 
mentionnées dans l'article qui précède, les 
parties peuvent être examinées sous 
serment, ainsi qu'il est pourvu au titre: Des 
Obligations. 
Article 2346 
The provisions concerning bills of 
exchange contained in this title apply to 
promissory notes when they relate to the 
following subjects, viz:,  
1. The indication of the payee;  
2. The time and place of payment;  
Les dispositions relatives aux lettres de 
change contenues dans ce titre 
s'appliquent aux billets promissoires quant 
aux matières suivantes, savoir:  
1. L'indication du preneur;  
2. Le temps et le lieu du paiement; 
3. The expression of value;  
4. The liability of the parties;  
5. Negotiation by endorsement or 
delivery;  
6. Presentment and payment;  
7. Protest for non-payment and notice;  
8. Interest, commission, or usury;  
9. The law and the rules of evidence to be 
applied;  
10. Prescription.  
3. L'expression de la valeur;  
4. Le responsabilité des parties;  
5. La négociation par endossement ou par 
délivrance; 
6. La présentation et le paiement;  
7. Le protêt faute de paiement et l'avis;  
8. L'intérêt, la commission et l'usure; 
9. La loi et la preuve applicables; 
10. La prescription.  
 
Article 2354 
In the absence of special provisions in this 
sections, cheques are subject to the rules 
concerning inland bills of exchange in so 
far as their application is consistent with 
the usage of trade. 
En l'absence de dispositions spéciales 
dans cette section, les chèques sont 
soumis aux règles relatives aux lettres de 
change à l'intérieur, en autant que 
l'application en est compatible avec 
l'usage du commerce. 
 
APPENDIX II 
INTEREST 
Article 1077 
The damages resulting from delay in the 
payment of money, to which the debtor is 
liable, consist only on interest at the rate 
legally agreed upon by the parties, or, in 
the absence of such agreement, at the rate 
fixed by law.  
Dans les obligations pour le paiement 
d'une somme d'argent, les dommages-
intérêts résultant du retard ne consistent 
que dans l'intérêt au taux légalement 
convenu entre les parties, ou en l'absence 
de telle convention, au taux fixé par la loi.  
These damages are due without the 
creditor being obliged to prove any loss. 
They are due from the day of the default 
only, except in the cases where by law 
they are due from the nature of the 
obligation.  
This article does not affect the special 
rules applicable to bills of exchange and 
contracts of suretyship.  
Ces dommages-intérêts sont dus sans que 
le créancier soit tenu de prouver aucune 
perte. Ils ne sont dus que du jour de la 
mise en demeure, excepté dans les cas où 
la loi les fait courir plutôt, à raison de la 
nature même de l'obligation.  
Le présent article n'affecte point les règles 
spéciales applicables aux lettres de change 
et aux cautionnements. 
Article 1078 
Interest accrued from capital sums also 
bears interest:  
1. When there is a special agreement to 
that effect;  
2. When is any action brought such new 
interest is specially demanded;  
3. When a tutor has receives or ought to 
have received interest upon the moneys of 
his pupil and has failed to invest it within 
the term prescribed by law.  
Les intérêts échus des capitaux produisent 
aussi des intérêts:  
1. Lorsqu'il existe une convention 
spéciale à cet effet;  
2. Lorsque dans une action ces nouveaux 
intérêts sont spécialement demandés; 
3. Lorsqu'un tuteur a reçu ou dû recevoir 
des intérêts sur les deniers de son pupille 
et a manqué de les employer dans le 
temps fixe par la loi. 
 
Article 1785 
Interest upon loans is either legal or 
conventional.  
The rate of legal interest is fixed by law at 
six per cent yearly.  
The rate of conventional interest may be 
fixed by agreement between the parties, 
with the exception:  
1. Of certain corporations mentioned in 
L' intérêt sur prêt est ou légal ou 
conventionnel.  
Le taux de l'intérêt légal est fixé par la loi 
à six pour cent par année.  
Le taux de l'intérêt conventionnel peut 
être fixé par convention entre les parties, 
excepté:  
1. Quant à certaines corporations, 
the act, intituled: An act respecting 
interest, which cannot receive more than 
the legal rate of six per cent;  
2. Of certain other corporation which are 
limited as to the rate of interest by special 
acts;  
3. Of banks, which cannot receive more 
than seven per cent.  
mentionnées en l'acte intitulé: Acte 
concernant l'intérêt, qui ne peuvent 
recevoir plus que le taux légal de six pour 
cent;  
2. Quant à quelques autres corporations 
qui par des statuts spéciaux sont limitées 
à certains taux d'intérêt;  
3. Quant aux banques qui ne peuvent 
recevoir plus de sept pour cent. 
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